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Preface 
The Forward Studies Unit has been actively involved with the project which gave rise 
to the present report by Christian Deubner. Our unit has always been interested in 
questions relating to 'differentiation', 'closer co-operation~, '_flexibility' or how ever 
one might call the possibility of an avant-garde of Member States leading the way to 
more integration in certain policy areas even if not all the other Member States are 
able or wish to follow at a given time. See for example the study "How to make use of 
closer co-operation? The Amsterdam Clauses and the Dynamics of European 
Integration" by Francesco Milner and Alkuin Kolliker (Forward Studies Unit 
Working Paper 2000). 
The Forward Studies Unit's contribution to this project, carried out by the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik mainly consisted at organising a workshop in Brussels, 
giving participants the opportunity to discuss with the officials from the Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament, dealing with the relevant policy areas. 
Also we see the publication of this report in our working paper series as a significant 
contribution to the realisation of the project, because it helps to ensure an adequate 
distribution of its content. 
The problems raised in this report are at the centre of current attention. Not only with 
regard to the intergovernmental conference for the revision of the Treaties, but also 
with regard to the new debate on the ultimate goal of European integration in view of 
the forthcoming enlargement of the Union to include a considerable number of new 
Member States. 
Jean-Claude Thebault 
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Introduction and Recommendations 
This report presents the results of seven hearings on enhanced cooperation between 
European Union member states in the light of the changes made by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. In this Treaty, the member states added a number of important new 
clauses on enhanced cooperation. The most momentous innovation brought by these 
clauses was that enhanced cooperation between member states, which had been 
practised in a freely agreed manner outside the Treaty system proper since the early 
days of European Integration in the 1950s can now be implemented within the 
institutional framework of the EU, and utilise its institutions and procedures. The 
organisation of the hearings and the types of questions asked derived from the 
organisation of these new clauses on enhanced cooperation in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
The treaty introduces a (new) general clause (Art. 43--45 Treaty on European 
Union) on the establishment of closer cooperation, inserted as the new title VII in the 
common provisions of the TEU. It then added two specific clauses on establishing 
closer cooperation, in the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) which 
concerns the first pillar (Art. 11), and in the TED on Justice and Home Affairs, which 
concerns the third pillar (Art. 40). Negotiators and academics have agreed on calling 
this the "enabling" method of closer cooperation. The second pillar, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), gained only a 'negative' way to closer cooperation in the 
form of the so-called "constructive abstention", a qualified abstention clause (Art. 23, 
par. 1 TEU) permitting member states to stay out of foreign policy measures decided 
by others, eo ipso making a closer cooperation group for that specific policy. Here, the 
widely accepted term is "case-by-case" flexibility. And finally, the member states 
decided hie et nunc on creating a closer cooperation group (under Art. 43 and 40, 
TEU, and 11, TEC) for the transfer of the Schengen acquis into the treaty system, 
which excluded the UK together with the Republic of Ireland and Denmark. Here, 
"predefined" flexibility has become the generally accepted term. 
The seven hearings were the collective enterprise of leading international relations 
institutes in five member states and one candidate country, and the forward studies 
unit of the European Commission. They brought together an. international team of 
experts, parliamentarians and officials in the respective countries and the European 
Union between January and December 1998. When regarding the results of these 
hearings, four questions concerning the implementation of the new clauses and the 
interpreation of their functioning and their consequences are of special importance: 
I . Whether and in which fields and circumstances these new clauses are likely to be 
utilised, in addition to or instead of, the existing mode of enhanced cooperation. 
2. Whether, therefore, the face of enhanced cooperation in itself will actually 
change. 
3. Whether the effectiveness of reinforced cooperation can change or be improved. 
4. And whether its meaning for the integration process altogether will change. 
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As the expert team wanted to appraise the enhanced cooperation clauses of 
Amsterdam in the c01;1text of pre-Amsterdam flexibility, the study also included 
Economic and Monetary Union, the enhanced cooperation in monetary policy which 
the Maastricht treaty had earlier established in the institutional framework of the EU. 
Results: 
In summary form, the answers to these questions were as follows: 
1. The testimonies heard during the seven hearings gave rise to the following rough 
ranking, concerning the probability, fields and timescale of the application of new 
institutional enhanced cooperation (IEC). 
Predefined enhanced cooperation being laid down directly in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, its utilisation is imminent, as soon as the Amsterdam Treaty enters into 
force. As it covers a wide range of competences, with the broad sector of free 
movement of persons in the EU (including the Schengen acquis ), and large parts 
of economic and monetary policy cooperation, predefined enhanced cooperation is 
certain to play an important and visible role. Second in probability and imminence 
is likely to be the so-called case-by-case enhanced cooperation in low profile 
European foreign policy issues. In third place one is likely to find enabling 
enhanced cooperation in the third pillar within the area of police and judicial 
policy cooperation, and lastly, enabling enhanced cooperation within the internal 
market. 
.Clearly, the officials we interviewed preferred to consider enabling-mode 
enhanced cooperation more as a bargaining tool in negotiations to be brandished 
against obstructive member governments rather than as a new mode of integration 
policy to actually put into operation. One reason for this lies in member states' 
fears of incalculable effects on the EU system if the new instrument were in fact to 
be implemented. The second major obstacle to this option of last resort is to be 
seen in the severe conditions which have to be met, the very high investment 
demanded of member states willing to utilise this new instrument, as well as the 
continuing high controversy surrounding its potential use. Finally, FEC, as 
practised before Amsterdam will be continued. In part, new initiatives of this kind 
are seen to spring directly from the enhanced cooperation begun under the new 
Amsterdam clauses, for example in provoking the creation of limited Councils as 
in the case of the Euro- I I . Others are the result of original member state 
preferences, in the field of CFSP for instance. 
2. The face of enhanced cooperation, as EU member states actually conduct it, has 
already been substantially changed by the inclusion of monetary cooperation and 
Schengen into the institutional framework. Highly important fields of enhanced 
cooperation, which had heretofore been conducted in the mode of freely 
determined rules established by the groups concerned, have thus been fully 
subjected to the laws of the European Union. These now actually regulate an 
important part of enhanced cooperation. However the other category not 
controlled by these laws, FEC, is unlikely to disappear. In fact it is more likely to 
increase in the future. 
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· 3. The hearings did not reveal that officials were convinced by the potential of 
enhanced coop~ration to increase the effectiveness of EU decision-making and 
policy implementation. Would the effectiveness of new cooperation groups or of 
the EU as a whole be improved (a) by advances in certain areas, or (b) by stronger 
pressure in negotiations exerted against recalcitrant member states? As to (b ), the 
urgency of this problem was seen to be much reduced by the less eurosceptic 
attitude of the UK government after the general election of May 1997. But even so 
officials in many capitals clearly expected gains in effectiveness for EU 
integration in general from the existence of this new ·option against obstruction. 
The Spanish position, on the other hand, showed continuing and well argued 
reservations against the idea that this change in the bargaining powers would 
actually ease negotiations. 
As for (a), there were very mixed judgements concerning effectiveness gains for 
the Union to be had from advances in certain areas, and perhaps all policy fields. 
The pervasive concern was that such advances might produce externalities which 
would harm neighbouring areas of the acquis making further well-ordered 
advances in the acquis impossible, and possibly having harmful effects in other 
important aspects of the integration process. 
In this context, the Commission insisted strongly on the importance of tightly 
circumscribing the fields in which IEC could be applied. It could not be allowed 
for any individual directive, i.e. in matters of detail, but only for closely related 
matters forming a comprehensive policy field. This was the condition for giving a 
positive contribution. If such enhanced cooperation was permitted in small-scale 
fields, perhaps to facilitate decision-making on certain contentious directives, even 
in fields subject to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), cooperation groups of 
varying composition and interest risked parceling important policy fields out 
among themselves and in that way ripping them apart. 
In addition, enhanced cooperation in the new Amsterdam mode seems to have an 
inherent tendency to provoke initiatives of FEC alongside, which could well 
neutralise some of the effectiveness gains made under the new rules. 
4. In the past, enhanced cooperation contributed substantially to Community 
building inside European integration. The EU careers of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) and Schengen confirm this. Could this contribution be maintained 
or even strengthened if such projects of enhanced cooperation were in the future to 
be initiated within the institutional framework of the EU? The hearings confirmed 
the belief of certain governments that such an effect would come about but the 
majority of those parliamentarians and officials interviewed did not seem to share 
this opinion. 
On the contrary, uncertainties, doubts and concerns featured strongly among the 
member state and European Commission officials and parliamentarians who were 
interviewed. A high ranking Commission official said that uncertainty and doubt 
were the normal reaction vis-a-vis a new and important institutional change within 
the EU, and that time and practice would be needed to exploit its positive 
potential. This was however an optimistic assessment in comparison to all the 
hearings. Taking all of this into account, it is better at this stage to hold back on 
answering the question on IEC and Community building. 
First, very little new enhanced cooperation is expected under the clauses of 
Amsterdam. What Amsterdam brought in the way of predefined fields of 
enhanced cooperation (Schengen acquis and EMU amendment) dates from before 
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this Treaty reform and has already made its most important contribution to 
integration. 
Secondly, as they have been established inside the EU from their creation,· new 
enhanced cooperation initiatives in the IEC mode will probably lack some of the 
potential to challenge the EU into taking new steps towards deepening, which 
FEC outside the institutional framework had and has. They will not be able to 
exploit their fund of cooperation will and ability as fully and go as far as a self 
determined and homogeneous group of member states can. As a consequence 
there will be no comparable functional challenge to the EU' s authority from 
outside the Union forcing it to catch up or do better. With such initiatives already 
inside the EU the step of full communautisation of these initiatives, which 
incidentally deepens the integration of the Union as a whole, is not equally urgent. 
The negative effects of deepening internal divisions and reducing the efficiency of 
an established decision-making process accepted by all, are often feared to be 
greater. 
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The first difficulty was to take "into proper account the political developments which 
arose during the thirteen months in which the hearings were held and work on the 
report concluded. After all, the hearings began in January 1998 and ended only in 
December of that same year. Most important perhaps during this period was the fact 
that the German government, which had co-initiated and energetically pushed the new 
flexibility project of 1997, was voted out of office. Some of the new government's 
views on the subject differ. For instance, the caution of the old government on 
enhanced cooperation in the field of economic and social policy has almost 
disappeared and given place to a very positive attitude. In a more general sense 
expectations concerning the perspective of enhanced cooperation seem to have 
diminished within all governments. 
The second difficulty was to properly separate the presentation of the factual evidence 
in the First Part from that of interpretation in the Second Part. To present the facts in 
an ordered way has entailed using a measure of interpretation, chosen to be as general 
and consensual as possible, but which reflects the preferences of the author which 
may be open to criticism. 
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Part .one: The Factual Evidence 
I. General Aims 
The aim of this project is to give European decision makers and politicians a better 
understanding of the potential of the new 'enhanced cooperation' among EU member 
states, and to find appropriate ways of handling this instrument, in the light of the 
changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam. With this aim, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, together with five other policy research institutes and the forward studies unit 
of the European Commission, organised six hearings with national parliamentarians 
and government officials responsible for European policy in The Hague, Bonn, Rome, 
Madrid, Copenhagen and Warsaw, as well as a seventh with the European 
Commission in Brussels, between January and December 1998. A group of experts 
from seven European countries conducted these hearings, and the aim of this final 
report is to present the results, synthesise them and attempt an initial evaluation. I 
For the names of the experts and the officials and parliamentarians who were interviewed, see the 
. annexes. The following general report is based on the notes taken by the author and by 
Mr. Thomas Schiller, and on the individual reports on each of the national hearings, produced by 
the participating institutes: 
• Flexibility and strengthened co·operation in the EU since Amsterdam, Report on the Dutch 
hearing, The Hague, 27 January 1998, by Dr J. Rood (The Netherlandslnstitute for 
International Relations, Clingendael}, on behalf of DIA, Amsterdam 
• The German Hearing on Enhanced Cooperation in the EU after Amsterdam, Bonn, 17 
February 1998, by Christian Deubner and Thomas Schiller, SWP, Ebenhausen 
• A More Flexible Europe; Italian Perspectives, Report on the Italian Hearing on Enhanced 
Cooperation in the EU, 27·28 March 1998, CeSPI, Rome 
• Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the EU: A Spanish Vision. Summary of the 
hearings in Madrid on May 25th and 26th, 1998, by J.M.Beneyto, Fundaci6n BBV, Madrid 
• The Copenhagen Hearing on Flexibility/Enhanced Cooperation in the EU, 30 September 
1998, DUPI, Copenhagen 
• Flexibility in the EU from the Polish Perspective, Warsaw, 1 October 1998, Excerpts from 
the Hearing protocol, CIR, Warsaw 
• Enhanced Cooperation and Flexibility after the Amsterdam Treaty. Hearing with the 
European Commission, 30 November/] December 1998, notes by Thomas Schiller. 
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II. Questions Asked 
1. Treaty Clauses and Early Debate 
The organisation of the hearings and the kinds of questions asked derived from the 
organisation of the new clauses of enhanced cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
itself. The treaty introduces a (new) general clause (Art. 43.,._45 TEU) on the 
establishment of closer cooperation, inserted as the new title VII in the common 
provisions of the TEU. It then added two specific clauses on establishing closer 
cooperation in the TEC, which concerns the first pillar (Art. 11), and in the TEU on 
Justice and Home Affairs, which concerns the third pillar (Art. 40). Negotiators and 
academics have agreed to call this the "enabling" method of closer cooperation. 
CFSP in the second pillar was originally also considered by certain member countries 
as a candidate for possible closer cooperation.2 But very soon into negotiations it 
became clear that this was unacceptable to a number of other member states so the 
second pillar gained only a 'negative' way towards closer cooperation, in the form of 
the so-called "constructive abstention", a qualified abstention clause in Art. 23, par. I 
TEU, permitting member states to stay out of foreign policy measures decided by the 
others, eo ipso making a closer cooperation group out of those, for that specific 
policy. Here, the widely accepted term is "case-by-case" flexibility. 
Finally, the member states which wanted to strengthen EU competences pertaining to 
the free movement of persons inside the Union and which therefore pressed for the 
transfer of the Schengen acquis into the treaty system, against the resistance of the UK 
and Denmark, decided hie et nunc on creating a closer cooperation group (under 
Art. 43 and 40, TEU, and 11, TEC) for this reforming project thereby excluding those 
two member states and the Republic of Ireland. Here, "predefined" flexibility has 
become the generally accepted term. 3 
Common to these new Amsterdam Treaty options of entering into and implementing 
flexibility or enhanced cooperation is that they are explicitly authorised by the 
member states and that they happen within the institutional framework of the 
European Union. Meanwhile scientific research has analysed them from different 
angles and accordingly come up with a number of important differentiations in 
terminology.4 For the sake of simplicity, the different options discussed in the 
following text will nevertheless all be called Institutional Enhanced Cooperation or 
IEC. This text will give a detailed introduction to each of them to enable the reader to 
14 
2 Alexander Stubb tells the story in his account of the genesis of 'flexibility' in the 
intergovernmental conference of 1996-7, a Finnish diplomat who was present at the creation, cf. 
Dissertation in annex. 
3 Evidently, EMU's third stage is closer cooperation of the same kind, decided by the JGC of 
Maastricht. 
4 All of the experts who conducted the hearings have contributed to the scientific effort of 
understanding and interpreting post Amsterdam Flexibility. Cf. the short bibliography in the 
annex. 
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identify each category for comparison with their treatment in the work of other 
authors. 
Enhanced cooperation already existed before Amsterdam in an unregulated form 
outside the institutional framework and it survives after Amsterdam. For the sake of 
simplicity, and to mark its important difference to IEC, it will be called Free 
Enhanced Cooperation or FEC. 
Now and then the text will also speak of enhanced cooperation in a generic sense, 
without further specification. This will be meant to include ·both basic categories, IEC 
and FEC. In any case, the positions articulated at the hearings frequently referred to 
the system of analysis and doctrine evolving around the new flexibility. Therefore the 
presentation of results often takes the form of a commentary on this body of analysis 
and doctrine. 
A number of questions were immediately asked by all the observers. 5 Condensed into 
just four, they comprised the following: 
1. Whether and in which fields and circumstances these new clauses are likely to 
be utilised in addition to or instead of the existing mode of enhanced cooperation, 
2. Whether therefore the.face of enhanced cooperation itself will actually change, 
3. Whether the effectiveness of reinforced cooperation can change or be 
improved,6 
4. And whether its meaning for the integration process altogether will change. 
As the expert team wanted to analyse the enhanced cooperation clauses of Amsterdam 
in the context of pre-Amsterdam flexibility, it did not want to exclude EMU, the 
enhanced cooperation in monetary policy which the Maastricht treaty had already 
transformed and drawn into the institutional framework. The procedures, institutions 
and the scope of EMU were substantially increased and modified during the run up to 
and at Amsterdam, further increasing the weight of enhanced cooperation in monetary 
policy. Therefore, even though EMU is absent from the new enhanced cooperation 
clauses of Amsterdam, it occupied an important place in the programme of the 
hearings and it figures in this report. It is classed with the cases of pre-defined IEC. 
This treaty structure and this early debate largely defined the way in which the team 
of experts chose the member state administrations it wanted to hear, and together with 
the participating institutes, the way to organise their hearings with them. 
5 Cf. the bibliography in the annex. 
6 .,Improve" is here meant in a purely technical sense: Can it be plausibly demonstrated or argued 
that IEC is more effective than FEC in reaching the goal of successful Enhanced Cooperation in a 
given policy field, among EU member states (in terms of investment of time, other resources, 
goal attainment)? 
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2. Choice of Institutions to be Questioned 
a. Member State Governments and Parliamentary Assemblies 
At the root of new enhanced cooperation as an institutional approach to the 
accommodation of differentiation in the EU, lie member state governments with their 
specific interests in future European integration. The choice of the five member 
countries to be visited resulted from the impossibility of interviewing officials in all 
member states, and from the wish to represent at the same time most of the different 
sensibilities and attitudes adopted vis-a-vis the new rules. Differing traditional 
approaches to European integration were to be present, as well as basically different 
objective situations regarding the EU. In that sense, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands represented the founding member states, with high, if differentiated, 
levels of economic competitiveness, socio-economic development and political 
stability. Germany and the Netherlands represented a large and a smaller example of 
north-western states, Italy the southern European type. Spain and Denmark 
represented the more recent entrants, again from the North and the South, again of 
very different size, and still further apart in terms of development and 
competitiveness. They also hold very different attitudes to the instruments and finalite 
of the politics of integration. Finally, Poland was chosen to illustrate the perspective 
of a central European candidate country on new Amsterdam style flexibility in the 
EU. 
b. The European Commission 
The European Commission was included for a number of reasons: 
The major innovation of the flexibility clauses of Amsterdam is that enhanced 
cooperation can now be conducted within the institutional framework of the European 
Union. Member states going in this direction can avail themselves of the institutions 
and procedures of the Union to further their common enterprise and can profit from its 
status as a Union policy. The operational cornerstone of Union institutions and at the 
same time the strongest and most influential service agency is the Commission. The 
new flexibility clauses of the Amsterdam Treaty also sketch out certain procedural 
innovations for it. Its potential contribution to enhanced cooperation is therefore of 
enormous interest to member states. 
As it watches over the full observance of Community rules the crucially important 
service contribution of the Commission comes at a price. In Amsterdam style 
flexibility, within the first pillar, this position is additionally strengthened vis-a-vis 
those member states wanting to start an enhanced cooperation initiative together. As 
arbiter and gatekeeper, the Commission decides whether initiatives will be authorised 
and can start. It will decide if and which conditions have to be observed and which 
member states may later accede to groups of enhanced cooperation. For member 
states interested in entering into such initiatives in the first pillar, greater 
understanding of the Commission's intentions for handling this far reaching 
responsibility is therefore of great importance. 
Even if the Commission's powers as arbiter and gatekeeper of enhanced cooperation 
are much weaker in the second and third pillars, its contribution to the creation and 
implementation of Union policies within these pillars is also important enough to 
merit special regard. · 
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All member state officials and the Commission were interrogating themselves on the 
effects which the introduction of enhanced cooperation IEC style would have on the 
European Union's· structures and basic character. As the Commission is in an 
operational sense the central and most important of the supranational institutions of 
the Union, the development of the Commission's role in IEC would appear to be a 
good indicator of how the European Union develops as a whole. 
3. Thematic Organisation of the Hearings. 
As a consequence of what has been stated above, the organising institutes, member 
governments and European Commission easily agreed on a basic plan for their 
hearings. These were to be organised around the perspectives of closer cooperation 
after Amsterdam, looking at each of the three pillars, and putting Amsterdam type 
flexibility (i.e. in implementing the above clauses) into perspective by embedding it 
into the negotiating and decision-making system among EU member states with 
certain consideration also to be given to the older types of flexibility. It was also an 
attempt to give a more general official appreciation and evaluation of the role of 
flexibility in the EU in the light of the changes made by Amsterdam. Thus, a typical 
programme for the hearings looked like this: 
Table 2 - Typical Programme of a Hearing 
Italy's view of a flexible Europe 
Opening Speech: Piero Fassino, Undersecretary of State, Foreign Affairs Ministry 
The Legacy of the Amsterda'!' Treaty 
Silvio Fagiolo, Chief of Staff of the Foreign Affairs Minister 
The future of Enhanced Cooperation 
Giovanni Battista Verderame, Directorate General of Political Affairs, Foreign Affairs Ministry 
The Parliamentary debate 
(one-two members of Parliament) 
Economic policy and flexibility 
Introductory Remarks: 
Roberto Pinza, Undersecretary of State, the Treasury 
Roberto N igido, Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister 
One official of the Bank ofltaly 
Scenarios for foreign and security policy 
Introductory Remarks: 
Giampaolo Di Paola, Chief of Military Policy General Office at the Italian Defence General Staff 
Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Diplomatic Adviser to the Defence Minister 
Officials from the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
Italy's views of the European area of freedom, security and justice 
Opening Speech: Giorgio Napolitano, Minister of the Interior 
Flexibility as an instrument for common immigration and asylum policy 
Guido Bolaffi, Department of Social Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister 
Flexibility and police cooperation against organised crime 
An official of the Ministry of the Interior 
Fabio Evangelisti, Chairman, Committee for the monitoring of the Schengen Agreement 
implementation. 
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Ill. Answers Given by National and EU-
Parliamentarians and Officials 
In presenting the results of the national hearings a short introduction to each mode of 
enhanced cooperation will be -given. · These introductions, as well as other 
interpretative or explanatory text paragraphs of the author, are clearly discernible 
from the account of the hearings themselves. Spacing of lines is narrower, the text is 
indented. 
But the description of treaty changes only has a subordinate place in this report which 
is aimed at readers who are familiar with the Amsterdam treaty. Therefore with regard 
to each of our options, we are primarily interested in the interpretations, expectations 
and value judgements coming from the officials and parliamentarians who were 
interviewed. 
1. Order of Presentation: From the Apparent to the 
Speculative; From Immediate Legal Obligation to 
Possibilities of New Behaviour~ 
During the European Commission hearing, one of its legal counsellors insisted on 
separating the immediate legal obligations of the Amsterdam flexibility clauses from 
what he called speculation. In deciding on the structure of the report this objective has 
been -taken to heart. The report will therefore address the different legal options of 
new enhanced cooperation after Amsterdam, beginning with the option which appears 
clearest, most certain, apparent and most consensual, and ending with the one which 
remains least clear, most speculative and most contentious. 
These criteria suggest a series of subchapters, beginning with one on the immediate 
effects of legal obligation under the new flexibility clauses, and ending with one on 
the more speculative questions about the possible fields, extent of their utilisation and 
their effect on the integration process. 
Within each subchapter, a similar order will be observed. The 'Legal effects' 
subchapter for example, will begin with those instances of closer cooperation which 
are already predefined by the Amsterdam treaty, and pass on to those new clauses 
which leave the initiation of closer cooperation in the new mode to the initiative and 
additional political effort of the member states. These are likely to be the case-by-
case, and the enabling methods of closer cooperation established by the new treaty. 
The order of presentation chosen for this report deviates from the more familiar one of 
starting with the 'enabling' mode of enhanced cooperation as the most important of 
the new options. When Germany and France launched their initiative on a new form 
of enhanced cooperation in the EU, it was in fact the enabling type which they had in 
mind. This is reflected in the three principal clauses introducing "enhanced 
cooperation" into the institutional framework of the EU which only speak of the 
enabling mode. This is certainly also the most innovative and controversial form 
which enhanced cooperation can take. In political terms it also remains the most 
dynamic and interesting for one simple reason. Contrary to the large field of 
predefined IEC resulting from Amsterdam (and Maastricht, as will be seen), the 
enabling option relates to decisions which are still to be taken. The contest of 
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positions therefore is not only one of interpreting a framework already established 
(important as that may be), but of assembling political coalitions for future battles on 
the internal power structure of the Union's decision-making including each member 
state's position in it, as well as on the concrete issues which may become subject to 
decision-making in this modified manner. 
Therefore our order of presentation requires a few words of explanation. To 
summarise, the enabling mode of new enhanced cooperation Amsterdam style is the 
most dynamic one, it also appears to be the most difficult. to launch. 7 Being the most 
difficult it appears also from the outset the least imminent mode of IEC to be 
reckoned with. This assessment will be born out by the testimonies of government 
officials and parliamentarians. To an extent, the future development of the enabling 
mode also appears to be the most open and uncertain in comparison to the other 
options. It seems only fitting that the part of the report which examines the 
perspective of future developments in EU policymaking in all its controversy and 
uncertainty should come at the end. 
2. Legal Effects under the Amsterdam Treaty 
a. Predetermined Results as of 1998/9 
(1) Free Movement of Persons, First Pillar 
The concentration of civil justice cooperation under the community regime in the first 
pillar was the most important achievement of Amsterdam. This involved the transfer 
to the first pillar of a body of rules on the free movement of persons which had 
already existed in the relevant section of the third pillar .. This comprised visa, asylum, 
and immigration policy, and other aspects of the free movement of persons. The 
second and even more important body of rules on this and related issues had been 
established outside the Treaty system proper by the signatories of the Schengen 
agreements. The member states decided to incorporate this body of law, now 
designated as the "Schengen acquis", ·into the EU and also in a subsequent step 
(through a procedure called "ventilation", carried through by the Council) to decide 
on the definite position which every part of this acquis should take within the Treaty 
(TEU Protocol No. 2, Art. I and 2). One possible consequence was that different parts 
of this acquis could be judged to belong to different pillars, namely the first and the 
third; those parts which could not be clearly ventilated, would definitely find their 
place in the third pillar. An important piece of information concerns the role played by 
the prospect of eastern enlargement. Testimonies of JGC participants at different 
hearings clearly showed that eastern enlargement of the Union had been the most 
important reason for the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Union. The 
body of common rules concerning the entry of non-EU citizens, immigration and 
asylum, which had been developed in the 3rd pillar, and the freedom of movement of 
persons between member states, together with a system of compensatory measures on 
7 Jt requires the premeditated conception of new policies among a group of member states, their 
willingness to insert this new policy into the institutional framework and implement it there (and 
to refuse the easier way of free Enhanced Cooperation, FEC), against the resistance and at best 
passivity of the other member states, and at worst risking a veto. 
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the external borders as a principal product of Schengen, were to be made parts of the 
acquis. In this way, new entrants from the East would have to fully assume this whole 
body of law, which protects the Union from fragmentation on its most sensitive 
geographical flank, the East. 
While the United Kingdom, taking Ireland with it, did not want to be drawn into the 
Schengen system by virtue of its inclusion in the EU Treaty, Denmark did not want to 
become subject to Schengen in the legal forms of the first pillar. As soon as parts of 
this acquis are transferred or "ventilated" to the first pillar and ~ecome Community 
law, Denmark will therefore drop out of this legal frame as well. Denmark 
accordingly has a special procedure for adopting amendments of the Schengen acquis 
in the first pillar, as Danish national law. Legal obligations between Denmark and the 
EU resulting from this process will not come about under EC law but only under 
international public law. These three member states therefore remained outside most 
of this new common policy of the EU concerning both, the former civil justice matter 
from the third pillar, as well as the Schengen matter newly integrated into the Union 
or at least its implementation in the first pillar whilst letting the others advance. They 
do however maintain a right to a partial or complete opt-in into the different parts of 
the new free movement of persons policy of the EU (TEU Protocol No. 2, Art. 4 and 
5; Protocol No. 4, Art. 3ff.; Protocol No. 5, Art. 7). 
Under these conditions, enhanced cooperation according to the new Amsterdam 
enabling clauses was chosen as the legal instrument to permit the adherents of 
Schengen to implement and further develop that acquis inside the institutional 
framework of the Union. The relevant protocol authorises them to form a group of 
enhanced cooperation utilising these new clauses of the Amsterdam Treaty to 
implement their existing cooperation within the new framework. To this extent their 
enhanced cooperation will obey the rules established by the enabling clauses, but is 
~lready pre-defined by the Treaty. 8 
In the remaining free movement legislation as well, enhanced cooperation in the first 
pillar for the same group of participants is pre-defined, albeit not by a comparably 
explicit authorisation, but as the result of the three opt-outs (Protocols Nos. 3 to 5) 
given to the UK, Ireland and Denmark. 
Finally two non-member states, Norway and Iceland, which are already associated 
with the Schengen group and linked to the Scandinavian EU member states in the 
Nordic Passport Union, will also be associated in the implementation and further 
development of the Schengen acquis. According to the opt-outs for the UK and 
Ireland in this area, a special regulation will be formulated for their relationship with 
the two Scandinavian non-member states (TEU Protocol No. 2, Art. 6). 
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8 The ,,signatories to the Schengen agreements, are authorised to establish closer cooperation 
among themselves within the scope of those agreements and related provisions, as they are listed 
in the Annex to this Protocol, hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen acquis1'. This cooperation 
shall be conducted within the institutional and legal framework of the European Union and with 
respect for the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community", protocol TEU, No.2, Art. I. 
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(a) Free Movement Legislation Transferred from the Third Pillar 
Enhanced Cooperation .in this domain is the most visible and likely to be used of the 
different categories which figure in the new treaty. On this subject, the treaty leaves 
national integration policies. the least autonomy (whereas for Schengen the ventilation 
process gives them the time and the opportunity to modulate the degree of its 
communautarisation). It has already been stated that IEC is prescribed here by the 
protocols and the different kinds of opt-outs which they give (UK and Ireland on 
border control (No. 3), the UK and Ireland on title IV (No. 4) and Denmark (No. 5)). 
The opinions of the officials and parliamentarians questioned were in general very 
similar concerning the legal effects and their merits in that they thought a very 
complicated system would arise. For the most important measures regulating free 
movement concerning visas and migration and for legal cooperation in civil cases it 
would never be possible to work simply among all fifteen member states. Instead, the 
treaty already prescribed that policy would have to be drafted with twelve, thirteen, 
fourteen or possibly, depending on the positions of Norway and Iceland, sixteen 
countries. Danish officials emphasised their intention to stick to the Danish opt-out, 
including non-participation in the financial consequences of the new title (TEU, 
Protocol No. 5, Art. 1-4). 
The officials and parliamentarians interviewed were of one opinion in saying that this 
fragmentation of EU policy on free movement of persons was unfortunate and 
undesirable. In fact, the Spanish government declared having wanted to scrap the third 
pillar altogether and have a completely new common policy on freedom of movement 
incorporating Schengen. Amsterdam was considered only second best. Nevertheless, 
all officials and parliamentarians questioned supported the strategy of enhanced 
cooperation in this field; the opt-outs of the UK, Ireland and Denmark were the price 
of this policy's inclusion and communautarisation. 
(b) Schengen 
With the exception of the Danes, the officials and parliamentarians declared 
themselves in favour of a complete transfer of Schengen into the EU. A first important 
result of the hearings was that a large consensus became apparent among the 
participants concerning the aim of ~ventilation' of the complete or almost complete 
Schengen acquis into Community law (in the first pillar). Despite the risks of 
fragmentation, they considered this transfer even less avoidable (an "overriding 
necessity") than that of the former third pillar elements, because the continuing 
existence of Schengen outside the Treaty was thought to jeopardise the development 
of a coherent policy on free movement of persons inside the Community pillar of the 
EU. On all of this, there was no difference of opinion among the government officials 
and parliamentarians interviewed. 
Danish officials strongly confirmed the specific position of their country. As to its 
special procedure for adopting amendments of the Schengen acquis in the first pillar, 
as Danish national law, they were as yet unsure exactly how it would function, 
especially in those areas where Denmark would decide not to follow the further 
development of the acquis within the first pillar. An important commentary on this 
issue emerged from the hearing at the European Commission whose officials 
predicted that Denmark, being particularly closely bound to other full Schengen 
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acquis members in the Nordic Passport Union, would not be able to exploit its opt-out 
for any substantial divergence in freedom of movement policies. 
The only really controversial point in the hearings on Schengen flexibility concerned 
the modus of "ventilation" for the different components of the acquis. Ventilation 
taking place by unanimous decisions of the Council would open the door to 
additional, case-by-case unilateral conditions. In a number of hearings, Spain was said 
to exploit this possibility by making a sine-qua-non out of the acceptance of its 
position on the status of Gibraltar vis-a-vis the UK, thereby seriously impeding the 
ventilation process. Spanish officials did not deny this, but specified and justified 
these special conditions and sought to minimise the negative effect this might have on 
the ventilation process. 
An interesting aspect was constituted by the external relations of the Schengen group. 
Would its institutional make-up enable it to conduct such relations? Would they be 
possible under the post-Amsterdam conditions? German officials insisted on the great 
interest manifested by third countries to enter into contact and cooperation with the 
Schengen group, which had led to successful cooperation, the Schengen group giving 
priority to groups of third states, especially the candidates for EU accession. There 
had been no Schengen-specific institutional or procedural impediments to this kind of 
international cooperation. But in fact, its functional capacities had been too limited to 
give more and more positive reactions to that kind of external demand. 
(i) The Potential Fragmentation of the Schengen Acquis 
The distribution of important components of the Schengen acquis between the two 
pillars ( 1 st and 3rd), expected as a possible result of ventilation, was feared to subject 
their future evolution and their application to different legal regimes, thereby 
fragmenting a body of rules previously considered to be a coherent whole by most 
governments questioned. This elicited sentiments of regret, especially from the home 
affairs officials questioned, who had been masters of the creation and implementation 
of the Schengen system in its original form, and been most affected by its unexpected 
transfer from their own into Union-competence at Amsterdam. 
Additional fragmentation was feared from the new options of differentiation within 
the two pillars through the opening up of the Schengen acquis, formerly fully shared 
among its signatories, to full or partial opt-ins or a la carte participation, as well as the 
application of the new flexibility clause in the third pillar on the one hand, to the 
whole policy of free movement of persons in the first pillar on the other. One case in 
point was the British interest in a partial opt-in into Schengen (for example, regarding 
the Schengen Information System). Given the already high degree of predefined 
fragmentation which had been the condition of getting Schengen into the Treaty, 
further differentiation in this second sense was considered neither necessary nor 
desirable by the majority of officials and parliamentarians. Especially in Germany and 
the Netherlands they were concerned to have the broadest and most coherent common 
policy in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) for the EU. Officials of both countries 
showed themselves averse to pursuing differentiation. 
Testimonies of IGC participants at different hearings clearly showed that eastern 
enlargement had been the most important reason for the urgent incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis into the Union. The body of common rules concerning the entry of 
non-EU citizens, immigration and asylum, which had been developed in the third 
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pillar, and the freedom of movement of persons between member states, together with 
the system of compensatory measures on the external borders as a principal product of 
Schengen, were to be made parts of the acquis. In that way, new entrants to the Union 
from the East would have to assume the body of law in full. This was meant to be an 
explicit instrument to protect an important field from the temptations of opt outs, and 
this meant from a split, which its rigours could awaken in the aspirant members. 
Having attained this goal, interest in the implementation of IEC in this area was 
replaced by that of preserving the full unity of this acquis and its assured 
implementation in the EU. 
The Italian and the Spanish governments appeared to share this concern. In spite of 
this they demonstrated a more positive interest in developing further the policies of 
freedom, security and justice in the new IEC clauses in the JHA field. 
On this general line, Spanish officials introduced a condition of their own, ruling out 
application of IEC in the first pillar, but foreseeing it in the third. For the Schengen 
acquis in the first pillar, FEC was the declared Spanish preference. Polish officials did 
not give clear preferences but their general line on the issue of freedom of movement 
would seem to suggest that they would defend a Schengen application area which was 
as inclusive as possible. 
(ii) Conditionality 
Conditionality: A politically (and legally?) difficult point concerned the conditionality 
governing the inclusion of member states into the application area of Schengen (in 
which there are no border controls for persons travelling from one member state to 
another), a step which had not been identical with becoming a member of the 
Schengen Convention. Conditionality appears especially interesting because the 
"ability" to participate had figured prominently in the first texts introducing flexibility 
to the I GC, even though it disappeared from the final treaty, and because the most 
successful IEC and FEC projects to date, EMU and Schengen (area of travel without 
border control), both had a strong element of conditionality. 
Conditionality for the Schengen application area concerns the detailed agreement 
among the Schengen Convention signatories, that they will not accord the mutual 
removal of border controls to the interested member state, unless it fulfills a number 
of conditions (the so-called compensatory measures) primarily concerning the control 
of its external borders. In a way, this is FEC inside IEC. The governments questioned 
showed very different attitudes vis-a-vis this conditionality. 
The German officials considered it essential to assure the proper functioning of the 
Schengen system, and very strongly defended the right of the future Schengen group 
inside the third or first pillars to continue this conditionality. Italian officials also 
declared themselves in favour of a strict application of this conditionality to the new 
EU members due to come in from central Europe. A very high ranking Italian 
representative did however firmly insist that such a conditionality be an "objective 
one'', based on objective, measurable parameters, and "not subjective and arbitrary".9 
9 Prior to this, he had complained about the 'unfair' and arbitrary demands which other members of 
the Schengen application group had made of Italy, which signed the convention in 1990 and was 
only granted full application in 1998. One cannot help but think of the Italian experience in EMU, 
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On the other hand, the hostility shown by Polish officials against any informal 
cooperation of this consequential type appeared to derive clearly from the perspective 
of evaluation according to overstrict criteria and hence possible exclusion from this 
application area of Schengen. 
Among the fifteen current member states the conflict over this question may soon 
become a moot point. Negotiations between the Schengen application group and 
Greece on including that country into the area are now well underway. This will be 
the last member of the Schengen convention to accede to the application area. Will 
conditionality still be upheld here as stiffly as vis-a-vis Italy? Will it still be, can it 
still be, "conditionality", after practically every other member state which has the 
option, has also in fact been granted the right to be in? 
Discord might in fact erupt again only after enlargement, when the full extent of the 
assumption of the Schengen acquis, as a condition of entry (TEU Protocol No. 2, 
Art. 8, and Annex), is determined for the new member states. This will have to 
include the whole body of obligations and their effective implementation. Will this 
implementation - and not just the signature under the Schengen agreements which all 
present Schengen members started with - therefore be a precondition for acceding to 
the EU in the first place? This question was asked by certain well informed national 
participants of the I GC presented in the hearings. Or can one speculate on a kind of 
EMU model which makes the entrants members of this policy from the beginning, but 
gives a special derogation to those who cannot materially fulfill this conditionality, 
and obliges them to cooperate fully as soon as they are able to do so. I 0 
(iii) The European Commission 
The European Commission presented no specifically divergent interpretations of 
Schengen or the general freedom of movement title. Looked at from the 
Commission's perspective and compared with the former state of affairs, the transfer 
of Schengen into the Treaty system at Amsterdam brought a clear improvement 
despite some remaining imperfections. However these imperfections, resulting for 
instance from the opt-outs, were seen to affect not so much the new system as a whole 
but rather the respective member states. Like the national officials, those of the 
Commission found the ventilation process of the Schengen matter between the third 
and the first pillar to be a veritable minefield. Again, it was not the existence of 
enhanced cooperation which affected the system negatively, but rather the modus of 
the ventilation ( cf. above for the member states). 
The problem most on the mind of Commission officials responsible for the domain of 
free movement of persons was directly linked to the Commission's most important 
competence in integration politics, the monopoly of initiative. They were concerned 
the other closer cooperation project with conditionality, which took place in the same period and 
in which the same kind of complaints were heard from Italy. 
l 0 A precedent of another kind, to enforce conditionality in the old Schengen area, was the 
reintroduction of border controls against a fuJI member of the application group, when its 
implementation of the rules was considered insufficient. This was what France did against 
persons arriving from the Netherlands, on the grounds of Dutch drug policy which was 
considered too liberal in France. 
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about being compelled by the Amsterdam Treaty to share the right of initiative with 
all fifteen member states in the third pillar (Art. 34(2) and 42 TEU), and for five years 
in the first, concerning free movement of persons, and in particular concerning visa, 
asylum and immigration (Chapter IV of the TEC, Art. 67(1)). Accordillg to a 
responsible official, this introduced a kind of "inherent flexibility", which could 
provoke very awkward differentiation even at the stage of initiative. Did member 
states really want this? 
In exercising their role as guardians of the Treaties vis-a-vis the ventilation of the 
Schengen acquis matter, Commission officials acknowledged their limits. They 
recalled their initial opposition to this method, itself the result of a compromise. 
Answering concrete questions on this point, which referred to the institutional unity of 
the pillars to suggest an appeal to the European Court of Justice if the ventilation into 
the first pillar failed, they did not see any possibilities. In that case, the whole 
Schengen matter would have to remain in the third pillar, as prescribed by the Treaty 
in Protocol No. 2, Art. 1. 
The role of the Commission in external relations ( cf. also the member states) was 
alluded to in asking, who the Commission would actually represent vis-a-vis third 
states in the policy domain of free movement of persons and judicial cooperation. 
Would this be only the enhanced cooperation group(s)? Concerning the first pillar, 
officials stated that international relations in this domain would be conducted by the 
Commission according to Community law, even though it did expect opposition from 
certain member states. As to JHA matter in the third pillar the EU had no means to 
handle international relations with third countries. 
(2) Predetermined /EC in the Maastricht Treaty: EMU 
(a) Introduction 
EMU has been absent from most studies of new enhanced cooperation post 
Amsterdam. Therefore. this part of the report begins with an introduction to EMU-
enhanced cooperation which is richer and more detailed than in the other cases. Every 
government questioned seemed conscious of the fact that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
contained pre-defined enhanced cooperation in a number of important monetary 
policy and related fields. Commission officials clearly acknowledged this antecedent 
to Amsterdam flexibility. 
When examining EMU, and comparing it to the three new categories of enhanced 
cooperation post Amsterdam, it quickly becomes clear that it should be classed, like 
the Schengen Agreement after its integration into the Union, in the category of 
'predefined enhanced cooperation'. EMU has had a 'career' very similar to Schengen 
cooperation. Its predecessor, the European Monetary System (EMS), had also been a 
cooperation initiative of member states outside the treaty system proper. The 
Maastricht Treaty did then much of what Amsterdam did to Schengen five years later; 
it drew the EMS into the institutional framework of the EU and transformed it from an 
intergovernmental affair into a community one. It also radically changed the monetary 
system into a true monetary union. The procedures, institutions and the scope of EMU 
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were substantially added to and modified in the run-up to and at Amsterdam thereby 
further increasing the poli~ical role of enhanced cooperation in monetary policy .11 
Different to Schengen, the form of monetary enhanced cooperation had already been 
fixed at Maastricht and as ·such this made it a precursor to and model of predefined 
enhanced cooperation under the Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty 
did not name the member states which were to take part in the new common currency. 
It only defined (1) the conditions under which member states would actually be 
admitted to the common currency and subjected to the mon~tacy policy procedures 
and (2) the conditions which would therefore also close the door to those countries not 
fulfilling them, and, therefore, having a 'derogation' (Article 109k of the Maastricht 
Treaty) vis-a-vis the common policy obligations. 
However, the institutional framework and the procedures which determine and 
constrain the policy behaviour of the 'ins' are so closely defined by the Maastricht 
Treaty, that those member states which do fulfil the criteria and join behave in a 
predefined manner and within a predefined framework. This is predefined institutional 
enhanced cooperation (predefined IEC). 
Firstly there are policies managed by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
in particular monetary policy in its narrowest sense. Differentiation inside the 
institutional framework clearly manifests itself through the division between its two 
governing bodies. On the one hand, the Council and Executive Board of the European 
Central Bank (ECB ), which manages the common currency and in which only the 
eleven euro member states participate, and, on the other,. a General Council comprised 
of all inember states including those with a derogation for as long as there are non-
participants (Article 112 of the EC Treaty; Articles 45-47 of the Statutes of the ESCB 
and ECB). The latter exercises certain supplementary functions, primarily concerning 
the management of monetary relations between the 'Ins' and the 'Outs', and the 
eventual accession of the latter to the euro zone. 
Secondly, there are policies managed by the Ecofin Council, i.e. the sanctions 
mechanism in deficit surveillance and confrol, the international exchange rate policy 
of the euro (Art. 104 par.9,11; and Art. 111 TEC), and cases of secondary legislation 
for the euro zone. Here, we certainly have predefined enhanced cooperation but in a 
more ambivalent and untidy way, as it seems to oscillate between the IEC and the 
FEC modes, dependent on the exact 'phase' of these policies one observes. 
Regarding voting in these policy fields, the case is clear. The member states with 
~'derogations" (not participating in the euro) are not allowed to cast their vote with the 
others (Art. 122 par.3 TEC), eo ipso making voting in the three aforementioned policy 
fields a moment of predefined !EC for the others. This corresponds exactly to the 
Amsterdam clauses for IEC. 
But how to prepare this moment among the Euro-member states? Can this also be 
done in IEC mode? The answer is 'No', because the treaty charges the full Ecofin 
Council, and not only the Euro-member states, with the execution of the 
11 The two most important additions were the Growth and Stability Pact and the coordination of 
employment policies, cf. Treaty establishing the European Community, title VIII. 
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aforementioned policies, and therefore also with the debate which precedes the 
moment of voting. In general this corresponds to the IEC clauses. However there was 
and is a well-folinded and irrepressible urge of the euro-member states to reach 
agreement among themselves on the issues of international exchange rate policy for 
the euro, or handling the instrument of sanctions, before entering into debate in the 
full council. They also want to speak amongst themselves about other economic 
policy questions considered specific to the euro-area. 
The way to resolve this dilemma was decided on five mol)ths after the signature of the 
Amsterdam treaty during the Luxembourg European Corincil on 13 December 
1997 .12 It consisted of giving the Euro-member states an exclusive forum of their 
own, the 'Euro-11' group, which meets regularly before Ecofin meetings to debate 
problems specific to the euro zone and to prepare euro member states' positions. This 
solution is a curious hybrid between both IEC (in the first pillar) and FEC, and the 
predefined and the enabling kinds. In common with IEC the initiating member states 
have explicitly sought a decision of the Council to go ahead, that has been based on 
early prodding of the European Commission since 1995, and on its assent, the Euro-
11 group unites more than half the EU member states, and regularly invites the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank to its sessions. But it is FEC, 
in clearly declaring itself to be an informal meeting and debating forum, not a group 
which becomes fully competent for carrying out EU-policy. It has to share, however 
awkwardly, control over the aforementioned policies with the full Ecofin Council, 
which continues to hold formal and institutional competence for them. It is predefined 
because it is a result of the Maastricht treaty text and a European Council decision 
about the euro-member states. It is enabling because it was these member states which 
imposed themselves with their initiative for a separate group with specific 
competences. 
This solution was found amidst the resistance of the four non-euro member states, the 
UK, Denmark, Sweden and Greece, who wanted to be able to participate in all, even 
informal, meetings of the Euro-member states at their own discretion, suspecting that 
topics of legitimate interest to all Ecofin members, such as exchange rate issues, 
would otherwise be predetermined by this informal group. They had to accept a 
compromise giving them the right to be informed of the agenda and to raise issues of 
interest to them in the following Ecofin Council. 
The reasons for the hybrid character of this solution lie in the Amsterdam treaty text 
itself (see above) and in the basic difference between Germany and France over the 
role of a Euro-I I council. Germany, through its stability pact initiative of 1995, 
clearly wanted stability oriented political cooperation, separate from the Ecofin 
Council and all temptations of "gouvemement economique", as well as outside the 
institutional framework "like Schengen" 13. France on the other hand, wanted an 
institutional competence for general economic policy cooperation among the Euro-
member states in the Ecofin Council counterbalancing the ECB. The Florence 
European Council of 1996, at the instigation of the European Commission, brought 
12 See the reporting in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.12.1997, and Le Monde, 14.12.1997. 
13 Finance minister Theo Waige] in Focus, No. 37, August 1995, pp. 42-44. 
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the integration of this initiative into the purview of the Ecofin Council and directly 
linked it to other economic policy coordination tasks. This comforted the French 
policy line and resulted in reduced interest from Germany. This is basically the form 
which the Euro-11 took, even though Amsterdam further reinforced the treaty's link 
between stability and general economic and employment policy. Since then Germany 
has insisted on its informal character and· has resisted all attempts to give it political 
status and competences of its oWll, or a role inside EU-procedures. It did not therefore 
want the Commission to be present and it did not want a formal European Council 
decision for its creation either. France wanted a more weighty status closer to EU 
institutions, and has indeed been able to impose her will (smaller countries clearly 
preferring the inclusion of the Commission), but only to a point. The treaty text could 
not be overturned. 
As for policies in the fields of employment, fiscal policy coordination and 
harmonisation, other aspects of economic and social policy not already under the 
control of EMU or internal market legislation, the treaty gives only general rules for 
multilateral coordination of some of these: economic, since Amsterdam also 
employment policies (Art. 98-103, 125-130 TEC). Again, these rules demand 
compliance with the obligation on each member state to report on its economic and 
employment policies, to debate them in Council and to listen to and take into account 
the opinion and counsels of the other member states on one's policies. But there are 
no constraining mechanisms and there is much leeway in the manner to reach the 
agreed aims. For instance concerning the mode of cooperation which given member 
states might choose to advance in these fields, and they remain free to do this as long 
as they do not infringe the treaty rights of the others. This freedom is even greater in 
related socio-economic and fiscal policy domains. As for the euro-member states 
nothing hinders them, as it does the others, from entering into grouped cooperation 
among themselves in their 'Euro-11 ', or together with others in different 
constellations, either utilising IEC or FEC modes in order to advance together.14 
Therefore if monetary policy, and voting on exchange rate policy, the sanctions 
mechanism within deficit surveillance and control, and certain secondary legislation 
within the euro area, can be considered predefined !EC in the sense of Amsterdam, 
the debate about these issues and about multilateral economic and employment policy 
coordination among the Euro-member states can not legally be conceived as anything 
other than FEC, albeit in a hybrid form, half enabling and half predefined. Finally, the 
whole range of economic, fiscal, social and employment policies which might or 
might not be related to or motivated by the existence of the common currency appears 
to be open to enabling !EC or to FEC. 
14 Quite evidently, the strong legal constraints on IEC in the first pilJar will limit the freedom of 
movement of member states in EMU as well. 
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Table 3 . - Complicated Interplay between !EC and FEC 
• the absence of four members from the Euro zone means that the common 
monetary policy of the ESCB can be classified as IEC 
• deficit control with sanctions among the 11, exchange rate policy and 
secondary legislation inside the Euro area, has to be IEC at the time of voting, but 
FEC during the preparation of decisions, · 
• the relationship with the Euro-Outs is IEC, 
• deficit control and fiscal and economic policy coordination without sanctions 
among the 15 can be IEC, but can also be FEC, 
• grouped FEC in fiscal and economic policy coordination remains a distinct 
possibility 
Councils procedure has to be 
• IEC in deficit control with sanctions, 
• but can be FEC for other coordination 
(b) Member State Positions 
The expert group conducted its hearings in 1998 before EMU entered its third phase 
on I January I999. However, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Euro-11 compromise 
had already been implemented and agreed on, and the first Euro-member states had 
been selected by the European Council of May 1998. The Danish hearing took place 
only after the Euro- I I council had held its first sessions and the ECB had replaced the 
European Monetary Institute. It was therefore possible to gather initial national 
reactions to this switch to strengthened enhanced cooperation in monetary and 
economic policy coordination. 
(i) ECB Issues 
In the above, EMU policies were subdivided into those managed by the ESCB, the 
strictly monetary policy part, and those managed by the Ecofin Council, the related 
policies. If governments' attitudes are now examined, it c.an be seen that every euro 
member state government, even those whose membership had been in question and 
were still suffering from the efforts to meet the membership criteria, placed a high 
priority on the euro working well and appeared to fully accept whatever IEC appeared 
reasonable and necessary for this, especially within the ESCB and concerning 
decision-making and application of rules. This included the resulting differentiation of 
decision-making institutions and procedures within EMU. 
Even though all this had been signed and ratified by Denmark, the only non euro 
member state questioned by the expert team, the reaction from this country was very 
different. The end of the EMI, in which Danish central bank officials had participated 
fully in debating and preparing EU monetary affairs, the experience of being relegated 
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to the general council of the ESCB, while real business now took place in the new 
ECB council for which they did not even receive the agenda, had a "shock-effect" on 
them, about which they sp'oke freely in the Copenhagen hearing. They did not appear 
to question the justification of these procedures. But the experts sensed, among these 
high officials, regret about their absence and the wish to participate. 
(ii) Council Issues, Euro-11 
None of the participating government officials, apart again from the Danes and 
probably also the Poles, seemed to consider the question of differentiation at Council 
level a very serious one. This was perhaps due to the choice of governments 
questioned and to the fact that experience of the new system had not been gained at 
the time the first five governments were questioned. But a certain ambiguity seemed 
to facilitate this attitude. 
On the one hand, and in their principal reaction, these member states downplayed the 
role of the Euro-11 group. Certainly in Germany, the government of Helmut Kohl, 
ousted in the October 1998 general election, did not want to accord substantial 
economic policy coordination or, worse in its eyes, cooperation competences to the 
EU, whether this coordination was to be exercised by the Euro-11 or by the full 
Ecofin. They felt vindicated by the intergovernmental conference and the agreements 
on the stability and growth pact. Officials therefore strongly insisted that the informal 
and non-obligatory character of debates in the Euro-11 had to be respected; 
decisionmaking was reserved for the Ecofin Council. The Euro-11 was just a 
transitory stage and would anyhow dissolve into the full Ecofin when all EU members 
adopted the Euro. The Euro-11 was not therefore to be considered as an economic 
government alongside the ECB. 
If this served to underplay the issue of differentiation, the Amsterdam European 
Council on the other hand increased, despite German opposition, the weight of 
economic and social policy coordination between member states; a fact which was not 
lost on the German officials. As a consequence, they did show some willingness to 
utilise the new forum not just for discussing the vote in the Ecofin Council, but also in 
conducting economic policy coordination between the Euro-member states within the 
Euro- l 1.1 s Dutch officials had preceded their German colleagues with very similar 
reasoning. In an important point they alluded to the size of the monetary union in 
1999. With almost every member state a member, it was a far cry from the small and 
homogeneous initial Euro-group that had been envisaged in 1995/6. To an extent 
inclusive and comprehensive policies flanking it were called for, rather than attempts 
to devise, via enhanced cooperation, special integration strategies for a small 
vanguard monetary group. If other governments had always wanted a more activist 
EU economic policy, even they would appear to have noted the ambiguity contained 
in the treaty provisions for EMU. 
Italian officials seemed willing to imagine tasks for the Euro-11 in an even more 
concrete form. Could the Euro-11 not give guidance to the ECB on the external value 
15 After the change of government in Germany, economic, social and employment policy 
cooperation in the Euro-zone has become one of the official policy aims in Bonn, eo ipso 
increasing the role accorded to the Euro-11 group in preparing relevant decisions in this domain. 
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of the Euro? Could it not implement fiscal harmonisation among its members, if such 
hannonisation had been decided on previously in the Ecofin Council? 
In Denmark the establishment of the Euro-11 council, which now always meets just 
before the Ecofin Council and in which Denmark does not participate, generated 
resentment and regret among the officials responsible for this area in the economics 
ministry. They felt that their influence in the Ecofin Council was being reduced in 
comparison to the Euro-member states, since having just worked together in the Euro-
11, they would hardly start up the whole discussion again. in the Ecofin Council. In 
addition, the Euro-11 discusses all kinds of issues relating to monetary affairs, which 
concern the non-Euro member states as well. 
(a) The European Commission 
The European Commission's position in policy relating to EMU is not as strong as in 
the traditional domains of the first pillar. As to the different steps of deficit 
surveillance and control, to the exchange rate politics of the Euro or international 
monetary politics, or finally to economic and employment policy coordination (TEC 
Art. 99, 104 and 111 ), the Commission does not enjoy the privileged and 
comprehensive role in Council decisionmaking, which the monopoly of initiative and 
proposition gives it in most parts of EC legislation. Even so, it has, importantly, a 
right of regular surveillance and reporting, and on many issues the Council can only 
decide "on recommendation" (not proposition!) of the Commission, a privilege which 
it shares with the European Central Bank in exchange rate and international monetary 
policy. Formal EMU decisions are taken inside the Ecofin Council and it is evidently 
here that the Commission's institutional position is maximised.16 
This creates a dilemma with the informal FEC of the Euro-11, which was visible in 
the hearing. On the one hand the responsible Commission officials advocate the same 
position as the more prudent governments that the Euro- I I is a simple informal 
discussion forum. On the other hand Commission officials acknowledge their interest 
in making Commission opinions known to the eleven and giving them the chance to 
debate them before moving on to the full Ecofin. But the Commission could not 
formally present reports or give recommendations to the eleven, as their duty is to the 
full Ecofin. Even though it has a right to participate in the sessions of the eleven, it 
has to avoid even the appearance of giving them special treatment. The way that this 
dilemma is solved is through the Commission regularly passing its opinions to the 
Economic and Financial Committee in good time before formal presentation to the 
Ecofin Council. TEC Art. I I 4(2) gives the Commission ample opportunity to do this. 
All member governments are represented on the Committee and consequently all of 
them, including the eleven, have sufficient opportunity to prepare Ecofin discussions 
in this or other fora. Up to the spring of 1999, the Commission had not seen any 
concrete reason to exercise its right of recommendation to the Council in the EMU 
domain. Experience in this field, and in the way it relates to the enhanced cooperation 
of the Euro-eleven, is as yet incomplete therefore. 
16 The commissioner responsible for EMU, Yves Thibault de Silguy, has already warned against the 
institutional digression of the Euro-I I group. See Agence Europe, 28.5.1998. 
Harnessing D{fferentiation in the EU - Flexibility after Amsterdam 31 
Regarding concrete policy domains lending themselves to enhanced cooperation, 
Commission officials mentioned fiscal policy coordination, especially in relation to 
capital gains tax policy. Here, they declared their preference for clear coordination 
rather than different competing systems, without saying exactly whether IEC would 
be the instrument of its choice. 
(iii) FEC versus !EC 
In terms of economic policy coordination, German officials favoured autonomous 
national adaptations of economic policy, which might well advarice in parallel among 
groups of member states resulting from freely agreed coordination not based on IEC. 
The same pattern was foreseen for other minor initiatives arising in economic or fiscal 
policy out of the common currency. Polish officials in particular seemed hostile to 
this kind of freedom and would prefer to conduct all cooperation of that kind within 
the institutional framework where it could be controlled. As to other economic and 
fiscal policy initiatives flowing from the common currency, German officials 
considered them normal and expected results which could very well be taken care of 
in FEC as well. This attitude was echoed in The Hague and in Rome with Italian 
officials making the point that the common currency would have to be well 
established before such initiatives could be considered. Grouped adaptations of 
national and sub-national market structures could also be included in this vision. 
(iv)Economic Issues 
Government officials were on the whole reserved when asked if the common currency 
would necessitate more intensive economic policy cooperation for the Euro-member 
states than currently planned, because in the Euro-11, itself a kind of spill-over within 
an enhanced cooperation context, asymmetric shocks could no longer be neutralised 
by national monetary and exchange rate policies. In Germany the finance and 
economics ministries foresaw a reduction in such shocks as a result of the absence of 
contradictory monetary policies. As for other shocks, a more flexible EU-wide labour 
market would be able to absorb and adapt to them more rapidly. No need was 
therefore seen for additional and· restrictive coordination between member states. 
Enhanced economic policy cooperation appeared to be securely confined to a very 
limited field. 17 Little thought was apparently given to the question of whether the 
Euro-member states might need common minimal standards, for example in social or 
environmental policy, in order to protect their common currency from damaging 
challenges in these areas. 
(a) The European Commission 
The European Commission answered this last question in the affirmative finding 
economic policy coordination in the Euro group insufficiently developed; the Euro-11 
was the ""first step" and the stability programmes (of the Euro-member states) "one 
example". A bad policy mix had to be avoided and ''genuine coordination" was 
needed. This was to include the coordination of structural reform policies whilst 
17 The German change of government has basically changed this situation as for Germany, the 
Schroder administration showing strong interest to increase EU-wide cooperation in these areas in 
'Euro-land'. 
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coordination was to be institutionalised more distinctly than was the case within the 
Euro-I I. 
Questioned more closely, Commission officials seemed to move closer to 
governments' prudently reserved positions. For the management of asymmetric 
shocks, the stability pact appeared to be sufficient enough an instrument after all, 
whilst symmetric shocks could be handled by a proper monetary policy, eventually to 
be flanked by better coordination in fiscal policy. For these fiscal policies, the 
preferred method would have to be "soft" coordination initially by way of 
coordination in economic analysis among the Euro-member states, which would allow 
them to make a common appraisal of economic situations as a precondition for 
voluntary common decisions. There was no way of enforcing common behaviour. 
Another economic relationship, that between the Euro eleven and the four Outs, was 
highlighted by the Commission. If the eleven were to take coordinated structural 
policy decisions, this would have a knock-on effect on the other four. And as for the 
external representation of the Euro vis-a-vis the other leading currencies, the two 
countries participating in the new exchange rate mechanism with the Euro, Denmark 
and Greece, would certainly be directly affected. The institutional link between Ecofin 
and the Euro- I I had to reflect this special situation and the Commission would have 
to see that it was taken account of. 
b. New Future Behaviour Made Possible Under the Treaty 
(1) Case by Case: 'Constructive' Abstention in Common Foreign 
and Security PolicytB 
(a) Common Foreign Policy 
The post-Amsterdam rules for enhanced cooperation in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy comprise important elements of pre-Amsterdam FEC among member 
states and the option of IEC by default, case-by-case, which is offered by the new 
qualified abstention rule introduced in the EU Treaty at Amsterdam. The continued 
explicit authorisation of pre-Amsterdam FEC in CFSP is confirmed by the survival of 
Art. J. 4(5)~ TEU I 992, under the Amsterdam treaty Art. I 7(4). Whereas there is little 
disagreement about these two elements in CFSP, some doubt remains as to the role of 
new enhanced cooperation in the enabling mode. 
Enhanced cooperation in the enabling mode for the whole second pillar matter has 
been a principal aim of the IEC initiative by France and Germany since 1995 
(Germany having been one of those who even wanted the introduction of Q MV in 
foreign policy questions). This would have implied introducing a special IEC enabling 
clause into the second pillar, analogous to the first and third pillars, with a QMV 
triggering mechanism. Today the understanding shared by almost all government 
officials and by leading experts in this field would seem to be that the UK, followed 
18 Enactment of Conventions in 3rd Pillar Matters can also be considered a case-by-case ECIF, 
when not all member states ratify. Even so, it did not seem a problematic topic for audited 
officials and parliamentarians. Here and there, concern was voiced that their implementation, on 
the other hand, might prove difficult, because of the possibility that the new rules might be 
differently interpreted. 
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by the Danes, the Dutch and others, did not want the existing opportunities for FEC in 
this pillar, which gave them all desired freedom of action to be reduced by subjecting 
them to the constraints ofIEC Amsterdam style. This reasoning and the fact that the 
second pillar was seen by most as already highly flexible led to the last minute 
dropping of the proposed enabling clause. The Amsterdam European Council 
considered this addition as potentially counterproductive in terms of the visibility, 
continuity and coherence of the CFSP' s action. 19 In any case FEC retains a dominant 
role in this pillar. 
But there are dissenting voices, for example in Germany, which maintain that because 
the enabling mode was not explicitly ruled out in the second pillar by the Amsterdam 
treaty, this mode of enhanced cooperation remains legally feasible for common 
foreign and security policy. This may be more of a reminder to all concerned that this 
issue has to be taken up again on another occasion rather than as an interpretation 
intended for implementation in the future practice of CFSP. In the European 
Commission as well, certain officials appear attracted by an interpretation which states 
that title VII of the TEU (with the general IEC clause) can be understood as applicable 
to both the intergovernmental policy fields, including CFSP! (See below). 
The treaty of Amsterdam enlarges and differentiates the abstention option in CFSP, 
which a declaration to the Maastricht treaty had already opened to the member states. 
This 'standard' abstention has been carried over into the Amsterdam treaty in the new 
Article 23(1) of the TEU first paragraph. Its second paragraph adds the new option of 
qualified abstention, also called 'constructive abstention' .20 Whereas the 'standard 
abstention' of a member state did not discharge it from the obligation to participate in 
the implementation of the policy in question, the new abstention option explicitly 
allows this possibility to the abstaining member state, even though it commands its 
solidarity with the Union's policy. A grave disadvantage seen by many observers is 
that this procedure introduces a much more visible split in any foreign policy move of 
the EU initiated in this manner than simple abstention ever did. 
Certainly this is an option of IEC by default. If one or more member states were to 
avail themselves of constructive abstention from a foreign or security policy decision 
taken by all the others~ they would thereby make a group of IEC out of the remaining 
19 In March 1997, the Dutch presidency had already raised the question of the necessity of 'a further 
approach to CFSP flexibility, in the light of the possibilities opened by the constructive abstention 
mechanism, predetermined flexibility and the mechanism to confer certain tasks on some 
Member States within the framework of a joint action'. Philippart, Eric and Edwards, Geoffrey, 
"The provisions on closer cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam - The Politics of flexibility in 
the European Union", Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (March 1999) I, pp.87-108, p.99. 
See also Stubb, Dissertation in annex. 
20 The results of the hearings and scientific analyses appear to concur in finding that this abstention 
mode does not real1y merit the qualification ,,constructive". On the other hand this term has been 
so widely adopted in the meantime, even in official documents, that this report would risk 
confusing the reader if it did not use it as well. Consequently, case-by-case Enhanced 
Cooperation under Article 23(1) TEU will be referred to in this report under the (misleading) 
term: ,.constructive abstention". It is understood that this IEC in the 2nd pillar is different from 
1 st pillar IEC in some very important respects. 
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members.21 But frequently, auditioned government officials would not want to call 
something 'Enhanced Cooperation' which in their opinion was nothing but the 
modification of a· specific decision-making mode, simple abstention having been 
supplemented by 'qualified abstention' .22 This view was evident in Germany, but also 
in Italy. Both these member states had originally wanted to introduce enabling IEC 
into CFSP. 
Asked for their opinion on implementing this innovative Enhanced Cooperation 
option introduced in the second pillar by Amsterdam, the auditioned officials and 
parliamentarians generally responded reservedly. 
In these reservations, considerations of feasibility mixed with those of a more 
fundamental nature, namely concerning the suitability of this new option. Firstly, 
member states are considered to be "very rarely, if ever, neutral" or indifferent enough 
on a foreign policy issue (as Dutch officials stressed), to abstain and acquiesce in 
common foreign policies conducted on behalf of the EU by other member states. One 
reason for this, to which Polish officials drew attention, was that the EU status of any 
such policy, together with the obligation of solidarity of non-participants might have 
far reaching consequences in the second pillar, to which even abstaining states might 
not want to expose themselves. (Compatibility problems with foreign trade 
competences handled by the Fifteen, within the EC, do not exist, because there, as 
here, a qualified majority is the minimum needed to go ahead). And secondly, would 
not the credibility of a common foreign policy line vis-a-vis third countries be 
seriously damaged if certain (especially larger) member states ostensibly distanced 
themselves from that policy? Would qualified abstention not become '~destructive" for 
CFSP rather than "constructive" in such cases? Would this not damage the image of 
EU CFSP in general? The experts sensed a third layer of concern among Dutch 
officials, concerning the smaller state large state cleavage, in. particular in the event of 
large member states pressuring smaller ones to set aside their opposition to a given 
policy and letting them advance by means of Art. 23(1), which would smack of an 
unacceptable directoire by the large states. 
Certain governments seemed to apply both of these considerations to all kinds of 
issues for example the Dutch, to whom the absence of an EU foreign policy position 
was always preferable to one only reached by majority via constructive abstention. In 
CFSP, enhanced cooperation could at most only be acceptable for the stage of 
implementing policies which had been jointly agreed beforehand, not for the basic 
policy decision itself. 
Other governments differentiated according to the greater or lesser importance of the 
issues in question. For important foreign policy questions, where diverging national 
21 It merits mention, that the minimum size of such a group is larger than that of Enhanced 
Cooperation groups in the first and third pillars: Whereas there, a simple majority of member 
states can go ahead (even though it needs an OK given by qualified majority), in the second pillar 
this group has to represent at least two thirds of the weighted votes in the council of ministers 
(Art. 23(1) TEU, second paragraph). 
22 This links up, it would seem, with the concern of the Commission that Enhanced Cooperations 
not be practized in limited cases of EU policies, but only for long range and comprehensive 
policies. 
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interests of one or other member state were involved, they also declared that 
constructive abstention could not be envisaged because of considerations of both 
feasibility and suitability·. For less important and simpler issues, the 'suitability' of 
constructive abstention only appeared to be a secondary concern for them. On these, 
German officials asserted that an EU majority opinion on a foreign policy question of 
common interest - even where one or several member states abstained, was always 
preferable to the cacophony of fifteen individually nuanced national positions. 
Examples given related to UN voting or cases referring to other action in UN and 
other multilateral/international settings. Of the governments questioned, both the 
Spanish and Italian, but also Polish officials, shared this position, preferring a 
maximum of common actions supported by all governments, but agreeing to 
constructive abstention, as Spanish officials said, "when a majority would be willing 
to act, so as to get ahead with CFSP." 
FEC maintains its place in foreign policy. According to the officials and 
parliamentarians interviewed, it is granted a wider range than in defence policy (see 
below). Officials would not contradict analyses of experts demonstrating the range of 
FEC in foreign policy, especially where it went beyond the level of fully consensual 
formulation of common principles, or ad hoe declarations concerning minor issues. 
Examples cited included ad-hoe groups, directorates and contact groups as well as 
regionally oriented action. Experts predicted that this behaviour was likely to endure. 
An interesting debate arose around the question of whether QMV should be 
introduced in foreign policy questions thereby rendering the utilisation of enhanced 
cooperation in this pillar superfluous. This debate took its cue from the previous 
attempt by Germany (and other member states) to introduce QMV in this pillar as the 
standard method of decision-making for issues of foreign policy. Regret and 
dissatisfaction about the failure of that initiative remain in Germany, shared visibly by 
Italian officials and politicians, and possibly by others. Tempering these expectations 
regarding QMV, a very pragmatic position was put forward that even where formally 
possible, it was unrealistic to think of pushing policies through against unwilling 
member states by using QMV. This view was asserted by a very experienced Danish 
official on the strength of his long experience in the council of ministers. In the EU, 
there was no short cut to the search for consensus. The European Commission 
appeared to share this viewpoint. Experience in the second pillar seemed to confirm 
this for common foreign and security policy; QMV had never been tried since 1992 
even where it was possible under the Maastricht treaty. On the other hand consensus 
very often did not exist, and so joint action would simply often only be made possible 
after a lengthy search for compromise, or not at all. Or in the mode of enhanced 
·cooperation, this report would have to add. 
(b) Common Defence Policy, Including WEU 
The new rules also apply to security and defence policy: FEC predominates, 
constructive abstention is supplementary. Here as in foreign policy, the wreck of the 
flexibility initiative on IEC looms (see above), in this case supplemented by a project 
of the predefined kind, the proposal of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy 
and Spain to integrate the WEU progressively into the EU, which foundered on the 
resistance of the UK and others at Amsterdam. This would have created, in analogy to 
the integration of the Schengen acquis (but with a longer period of transition), a 
substantial set of predefined IEC for the EU in the defence sector. Even though the 
WEU has therefore not been definitely set on the path to become part of the EU, it 
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does remain, as the Maastricht EU Treaty states in Art. 17, an "integral part of the 
development of the EU". The view that the WEU is an intennediary case is often 
articulated; on the· one ·hand that it already constitutes to a certain extent EU treaty-
bound cooperation among a number of member states (this seemed to transpire out of 
certain remarks during the Commission hearing), whilst on the other it takes place in a 
different institutional framework with TEU Articles, protocol and declarations 
determining the relations between the two institutions 23, and in the field of defence 
and military related issues in which the TEU takes pains (Art. 17(1),(4), Art. 23(2) 
and Art. 28(3)) to assert the remaining freedom of member states to cooperate freely. 
The transfer of the WEU will in all likelihood be brought up again (see the last 
chapter of this report). 
Government officials and parliamentarians interviewed agreed with this interpretation 
of the set of rules modified at Amsterdam that FEC predominates, constructive 
abstention is supplementary. Even so, most officials understood that "freedom" of 
FEC under CFSP could not be read as meaning true national autonomy, for this they 
saw only a few remaining and increasingly contested 'windows', perhaps in 
armaments production, trade and procurement. After all, in defence and military 
policy EU member states are, as a German official pointed out, bound by their 
membership of either both or one of NATO and the WEU. But in the more widely 
shared reading of being "free" from restrictions posed by the EU/EC treaty, most 
auditioned government officials considered their alliance policy in NATO or the 
WEU as being in that class, even more so where NATO and the WEU themselves 
afford leeway for grouped action under their roof, as the oft-cited 'Alba' -mission of 
1997 illustrated, also often called 'ad-hocery'24,. Officials did not contradict experts 
demonstrating the many cases of FEC which characterise European security and 
defence policy in particular (for instance in ad-hoe groups, in directorates and contact 
groups, in armament cooperation), and predicting that this situation was likely to 
endure. 
Limits to FEC in this sense, were certainly set by officials' determination to protect 
the credibility and viability of the WEU and especially of NATO, from being put at 
risk by venturing too far into the field of military ad-hocery and accepted by almost 
all officials. Accordingly, an outspoken priority was accorded to a functioning 
23 An example of how difficult the exact evaluation in tenns of EU Enhanced Cooperation, of 
relevant initiatives may be, is supplied by the approval in September 1997 by the WEU Council 
of a harmonization of the EU and WEU presidencies from 1999 onwards. "Considering that five 
members of the European Union are not full members of the WEU, having the status of observers 
(Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Denmark), the WEU Council has decided that: - when the 
Presidency of the European Union is taken over by one of its ten Member States ipso Jure, this 
same Member State will also preside over the WEU Council; - in all other cases, the Presidency 
of the WEU Council will be filled by one of its ten member countries ipso Jure, following the 
current succession of presidencies in alphabetical order in English". This new order of succession 
applies from 1999 with Gennany chairing both Councils for the first semester (Europe, n°7062, 
20 September 1997). Is this Enhanced Cooperation under EU-tenns, not inside the EU but at 
WEU-level, among those EU member states which are full WEU members at the same time? 
24 Antonio Missiroli, Background, in: A.Missiroli (ed.), Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in 
European Security Matters: Assets or Liabilities?, Occasional Paper No.6, of the Institute for 
Security Studies of the WEU, Paris: January 1999, esp. pp.15 - 16 of his article. 
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Atlantic Alliance, and its reform, by a number of governments, especially those in 
Spain and Italy, but also in Poland. With regard to the WEU, the persistence of FEC 
(ad-hocery) under its roof appeared to frustrate certain governments more than others. 
The hearings showed this to be the case especially in Italy and Spain (both of which 
had supported the integration of the WEU into the EU), whose officials regretted that 
military actions even of a size which were accessible to the full WEU would still have 
to be practised within a free cooperation initiative/coalition in the WEU framework. 
Spanish defence officials insisted that enabling IEC for security and defence policy 
would have been an additional help in disciplining and restructuring the security 
policy behaviour of member states, even under the WEU. 
As to the place of constructive abstention in EU security and defence, the Dutch 
consideration seemed especially well taken, in that it could be one way to implement 
certain joint actions, which had previously been decided on consensually in the full 
council. 
( c) The European Commission 
As to the possibility of making Amsterdam enabling IEC applicable inside the second 
pillar as well, it has already been stated, that a high ranking official of the 
Commission put forward an argument along those lines, without though really 
defending it as a policy line. 
The Commission seemed very conscious of the prominent place of enhanced 
cooperation in CFSP, but one which was not IEC in the Amsterdam sense, but rather 
"multipoligammic in attitude". There was Europe a la carte, differentiation according 
to external memberships, for example in the UN security council which is sometimes 
a powerful temptation for taking distances to a common EU line, in NATO and the 
WEU, as well as in contact groups. This being as it was, further progress via IEC in 
·cpsp was considered doubtful. Constructive abstention was one instrument to 
facilitate the implementation of common strategies by the Council. QMV was the next 
stage, for instance, to facilitate further decisions on joint actions. 
In defence policy, the WEU could be considered as an enhanced cooperation group, 
confirmed by TEU Art. 17 which states that the WEU is an "integral part of the 
development of the EU". Defence, including military questions, was already in the 
second pillar, but its full fusion with the EU has not yet been achieved. As all defence 
initiatives would have to be compatible with NATO, the problem of the different 
membership of the two organisations posed a problem; NA TO having 11 adherents 
among the EU' s 15 members, the WEU only having 10. Here the main problem for an 
effective enhanced cooperation at least among WEU members seemed to lie in the 
absence of a homogeneous group among the I 0. Member states often took different 
positions in the EU, the WEU and in NATO. Perhaps there was a chance, given the 
changing British attitude on this issue that the next important step of European 
integration could come about here. 
On armaments industry cooperation, one important determining factor was the fact 
that only six member states had such industries. 
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(2) Enabling 
As this report reaches· the potentially most dynamic and controversial .category of 
enhanced cooperation under the new rules of Amsterdam, namely the mode of 
'Enabling IEC', it is necessary to recall once more the introductory remarks made at 
the beginning. They also give the reasons for introducing enabling IEC only at this 
late stage in the report. 
The enabling mode of enhanced cooperation is considered .to be permitted only inside 
the third and the first pillars. Its application is subjected to a very large number of 
stringent conditions concerning the subject matter chosen for cooperation, the 
procedure for triggering enhanced cooperation, and the decision-making methods of 
the cooperating group. Of the whole complex of rules governing enhanced 
cooperation after Amsterdam, these conditions are probably the best known part. 
Therefore they will not be presented in detail here. We will start instead with the third 
pillar. 
(a) Third Pillar 
In the third pillar, the clause explicitly permitting FEC (TEU Art. K.7) was eliminated 
at Amsterdam. This seems to indicate a prohibition on the use of FEC, and a clear 
obligation only to use IEC in this pillar. 2s Many government officials were of the 
opinion that possibilities for flexible integration in the enabling and in the predefined 
mode are particularly strong in this pillar. 
(i) Enabling in Schengen and Related Matter 
The Italian and the Spanish governments welcomed the possibility of advancing using 
the new IEC clauses in the JHA field in order to develop further the policies of 
freedom, security and justice. Although Spanish officials were much more reticent 
about applying IEC in the first pillar they explicitly foresaw it in the third. 
Danish officials considered themselves fully bound by the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis as long as they were located in the third pillar. They would participate in their 
further development and found this pillar more suitable for flexibility than the first. 
(ii) Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
A common concern for the officials we interviewed, and related to the belief in 
equality of legal protection for all EU citizens, was the unity of the legal order as an 
aim for the EU, especially with regard to criminal . law. Therefore, grouped 
cooperation in penal law was to be avoided as far as possible. 
Although German officials stressed this concern they saw the intergovernmental 
sector in the (reduced) third pillar as the most obvious candidate for IEC. On the one 
hand, the danger of citizens' legal rights being infringed could be partially checked 
via the grouped recognition of ECJ competence for jurisdiction in criminal cases 
25 The officials interviewed appeared not fully certain of the legal meaning of this treaty change. A 
number of the experts consider however that FEC does indeed remain admissible in the third 
pillar. 
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within this field (in fact to be considered as IEC in the logic of this report). On the 
other hand, there were ~elds where enhanced cooperation seemed better than no 
advance at all. 
This related to intensified cooperation of judicial authorities and police (for transfer of 
judicial files and evidence, for facilitating extradition and for easing hot pursuit). 
Enhanced cooperation on legal proceedings in criminal cases was thought to help in 
this field. Grouped common work on what the officials called 'legal cultures' seemed 
to be right as well, in order to find more common ground for punishable offences 
among member states which are geographically close, for instance on membership of 
criminal or terrorist organisations or associations. This approximation of material law 
was considered most difficult, but again, at least among states of the same legal 
cultures, considered better than nothing, especially if flanked by enhanced 
cooperation on proceedings with other member states. 
For Spain, Italy and Germany, enhanced police cooperation in the fight against crime 
and organised crime was considered both desirable and likely. Spanish officials 
considered the development of IEC in the area of police cooperation (development of 
Europol, in particular) to be a possibility. 
A very interesting aside was the sentiment expressed by high-ranking police officials 
in Italy (and known from France as well), that IEC between member governments and 
ministries should not impede operational flexibility between different national police 
organisations. Political authorities should be conscious of the fact, that in spite of new 
institutions the networks of personal knowledge and mutual trust between police 
forces would remain crucially important prerequisites for successful international 
cooperation in the fight against international crime. 
However, officials in Italy also stressed their interest in seeing this cooperation 
becoming as deep and as inclusive of as many member states as possible, otherwise 
organised crime might actually take advantage of the different levels of cooperation 
and crimefighting in different member state groupings within the EU. 
Another Spanish idea to advance via IEC is to facilitate extradition among member 
states to the point where this would pass in the same way as within one national 
judicial system. 
The Danish officials accepted the legal possibilities, but did not see any perspective of 
actual use debated in Denmark or other member states. It was only in the immigration 
sector, that related interests existed. 
(b) First Pillar 
(i) The European Commission 
In first pillar IEC, and there only, the Commission holds a uniquely strong position 
which deserves further explanation ( cf. TEC Art. 11, compare also the paragraphs on 
Schengen above). Not only does it fully play its normal role in the Community 
process here. but it is also the gatekeeeper deciding on the authorisation of IEC 
initiatives ( 11 (2)), and on the entry of additional member states to IEC groups 
including the right to specify additional conditions to be fulfilled on admission 
(11 (3)). Commission officials showed themselves to be fully conscious of the 
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exceptional powers they wielded in these cases. They justified them by citing the 
resistance of member states during the IGC to new rules on IEC which would have 
given members of established groups the right to decide on the entry of others. 
Schengen was held up as the example not to be followed as it had caused the strongest 
antagonism towards its self-defined norms of accession and full participation for 
newcomers. 
In this sense, they also seemed decided on interpreting their right of setting further 
conditions in authorising additional entries to IEC groups. in favour of the applicants 
in order to ensure that the openness of such groups did not amount to empty words. 
In its role as gatekeeper in controlling the compatibility of enabling IEC initiatives 
with the conditions set out in Art. 11, and as guardian of the Treaties in overseeing the 
proper utilisation of the new IEC clauses, Commission officials demonstrated their 
willingness to exploit these competences to the limits of their legal and material 
capacities. They also agreed with the experts that political as well as legal viewpoints 
had to be included in their judgments. 
(ii) Enabling in the Schengen Context and the New Title IV - Visas, 
Asylum, Immigration and other Policies Related to Free Movement of 
Persons 
Cooperation within the Schengen acquis matter in the first pillar will be IEC as long· 
as the three member states which opted out at Amsterdam do not change their stance. 
To an extent it is pre-defined !EC, but the treaty also opens up this field along with 
the rest of the first pillar to enabling !EC, in which as few as eight member states 
could participate, through the respective clauses (Art. 11, TEC). Finally, FEC is also 
permitted, a point which we will return to later. 
This seems uncontestable, but it has already been stressed that many of the 
governments interviewed had not really appreciated opening up the Schengen acquis, 
formerly fully shared among a 'coalition of the willing', to partial opt-ins and a la 
carte participation, allowed under the predefined form of enhanced cooperation in this 
field. The Italian and the Spanish, as well as the Danish governments appeared to 
share this concern. Nevertheless they welcomed the possibility of moving forward 
using the new IEC clauses in the JHA field, in order to develop further the policies of 
freedom, security and justice. However as has already been mentioned, the solution 
preferred by the Spanish for the Schengen acquis in the first pillar was FEC, not IEC. 
Even though Denmark had opted out of the first pillar vis-a-vis the Schengen acquis, 
and despite strong overall caution towards Amsterdam style flexibility, immigration 
officials from the Danish interior ministry were able to imagine three possible areas 
for enhanced cooperation under IEC. These were minimum standards for provisional 
protection (new Art. 63,2,a), burden sharing on refugees (new Art. 63,2,b ), and 
harmonisation of subsidiary protection ("everything which goes beyond the Geneva-
convention"). In addition they did not seem averse to grouped advances in the control 
of illegal immigration by means of a system of fingerprinting and of repatriating 
illegal immigrants. 
As to the European Commission and its responsibility for evaluating initiatives under 
enhanced cooperation and in triggering them in title IV of the first pillar, Commission 
officials thought it important to judge such initiatives not only on their legal but also 
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on their political merits in the context of integration policy. Concerning this, and other 
important tasks of the Commission in this field, they explicitly pointed to the limited 
means and manpower of the Commission, which restrained its ability to fulfill them in 
a comprehensive manner (this corresponds to the German comments outlined above). 
In exercising their role as guardians of the Treaties, Commission officials showed 
themselves determined to look out for misuse of the new clauses. 
Respect for the aims of IEC was demanded for the JHA field if it was to enable the 
EU to become one common legal sphere. This aim has in fact encouraged the 
initiation of IEC. · 
(iii) Judicial Civil Law Matters in the First Pillar 
Officials from the governments that were questioned demonstrated very different 
attitudes regarding judicial cooperation in the other non-Schengen civil matters which 
had been transferred from the third to the first pillar at Amsterdam. There seemed to 
be unanimous agreement that IEC should not be used in the areas of asylum and 
immigration policy (newly communautised) because this would seriously undermine 
the effectiveness of any EU action on migration. Again, many of them showed their 
belief that the unity of the European legal sphere (as far as it exists) should be 
preserved. 
One field considered worthwhile for grouped progress for large parts of the Union 
were fields of law which were close to the legal matter of the common market. Here, 
the most positive attitude seemed to exist in Madrid. For Spanish officials, IEC not 
only appeared likely, but also desirable, in:26 
• civil law 
• commercial law (a convention on bankruptcy which is expected to be the next 
case of enhanced cooperation) 
• banking law. 
Spanish officials attached great importance to progress in EU-wide civil law 
enforcement, for instance through the creation of a common European enforcement 
title, and seemed interested in applying IEC to advance in this field as well. They did 
not however say how and in which legal sector exactly they would want to go ahead. 
Other fields of law were considered much less promising because of persisting 
differences between member states. Even here, German officials when pressed to give 
examples of enhanced cooperation, saw some possibilities. Within what they called 
the great 'families' of the same 'legal culture' inside the EU differences were often 
relatively less important, for instance in family law, where the big difference seems to 
be between the latin and the protestant/nordic 'families'. Although unable to advance 
at the level of the fifteen, at least the relative closeness within the 'families' could be 
exploited in trying to extend the common elements of material law, for which IEC 
might be useful. 
26 We return to these points in the internal market section. 
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Danish officials reiterated the point that Denmark will not participate in judicial 
cooperation in ci~il matters in the first pillar although it will stay at the negotiating 
table. This alone will make IEC of any decision-making in such cooperation among 
the other member states and in the application of such decisions. 
(iv)lntemal Market Matters in the First Pillar 
Officials from all member state governments questioned (including Poland) shared 
the consensus that the internal market had to be protected against all initiatives which 
could endanger the open and level playing field for the free exchange of goods, 
services and capital, established for all members. All of these officials, therefore, 
accepted the severe conditions for introducing IEC in internal market matters in the 
first pillar. 
Within the internal market, initiating !EC in the enabling mode appears to be 
regulated, in a way, in the most explicit and most consensual manner among member 
states, perhaps because it is here that the treaty also establishes its most explicit and 
restrictive procedure. Not surprisingly, FEC was also often invoked by government 
officials, as an alternative procedure of enhanced cooperation in subject matter 
pertaining to or immediately affecting the internal market. FEC would have to respect 
the acquis as scrupulously as IEC in the enabling mode even though it is not subjected 
to the same set of conditions. Thus even in this apparently so clearly regulated field, 
different interests and interpretations make for varied and contradictory modes of 
enhanced cooperation in the future. 
One very predominant motivation for favouring FEC in this field was the very 
complicated and cumbersome nature of procedures following on from the choice of 
IEC, and the institutional· status which IEC would confer on such policy initiatives. 
German speakers wanted, for example, to be able to freely exploit opportunities for 
enhanced cooperation in the internal market resulting from EMU and its procedures, 
without making IEC projects out of them each time and thereby also avoiding all 
semblance of a "gouvernement economique". Dutch officials insisted that they wanted 
to be able to go ahead with grouped cooperation among member states with shared 
common interests, without having to make community projects out of them each time 
and therewith implicating the European Commission. 
Another kind of motivation was fueled by a strong reservation against opening up the 
internal market and the first pillar to IEC in the first place. Spanish officials 
demonstrated this motivation in the most assertive language, demanding that all 
enhanced cooperation in the first pillar should be FEC, not IEC. They, and officials 
from Denmark, went out of their way to show their hostility towards any possible 
future initiative of IEC which might put the integrity of the internal market at risk. 
In spite of these temptations towards FEC, IEC in the internal market domain was not 
considered impossible. Officials from economics and finance ministries or in the case 
of ltaly even from the prime minister's office, were when asked nevertheless able to 
envisage a number of fields where such IEC could after all, be legally feasible and 
politically conceivable. It was however conceded that an opposing member state 
could probably block IEC initiatives in almost all of these fields by energetically 
invoking the conditions of Art. 11, TEC, in the council of ministers, or in the ECJ. 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and the Commission made this point especially forcefully 
and a Polish official argued in the same way. 
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(v) The European Commission 
Asked for their opinion on these questions, European Commission officials insisted 
on the existence of clear limits to IEC in the internal market. They named the external 
effect of IEC initiatives on the internal market as the leading criterion for acceptance 
or refusal. External effects on the freedom of exchange and the equality of 
competition on established EU policies within the internal market or leading to other 
kinds of discrimination were unacceptable. IEC initiatives carrying such a risk would 
be rejected. The issue area and the regional scope of such initiatives were also 
considered to be important. It was possible to envisage IEC· initiatives which were 
regionally concentrated, for instance among only Baltic states, perhaps in regional 
fisheries policy, which would not interfere with the legitimate rights of the other 
member states in the internal market or under established EU policies. 
As to social and employment law the Commission did not see any necessity for 
harmonisation alongside the common monetary policy of the Euro-group. Social 
affairs and employment were concerns of the EU of the Fifteen. 
(vi) Synopsis 
The table No. 4 (see following page) lists these more or less hypothetical options for 
such enhanced cooperation within the internal market, as they were put forward by the 
officials questioned, grouped by country and with the specific qualifications added in 
one or the other case. (Asterisks precede those options which were named by more 
than one government). 
This short list shows a clear convergence of views, among the governments 
questioned as to hypothetical possibilities for utilising enhanced cooperation in the 
institutional framework. They see them in more fiscal policy harmonisation, where all 
Fifteen cannot be drawn in. The next candidates are environment legislation and the 
handling of services and intellectual property in external economic relations. Other 
policies were only mentioned by certain governments questioned, even though closer 
questioning might have revealed more identities of ideas, for example in the field of 
banking law or company legislation. 
(vii) Economic Policy Coordination 
Economic policy coordination has already been referred to in the context of the 
internal market and to a greater extent of EMU. It was very evident that the IEC 
enabling mode was frequently considered as too constraining and that German and 
Dutch officials in particular did not like it as it was a step towards "gouvernement 
economique". They clearly preferred to stay either within the mould of the treaty 
procedures for the Fifteen, or to choose the freedom afforded by FEC for advancing 
further in this domain. 
c. Legal Obligations of IEC and Member States 
(1) The Quality of Legal Obligations Resulting from /EC 
Engagements of Member States 
Officials were asked for their appreciation of the quality of legal obligations resulting 
from IEC. compared to 'normal' EU legislation, its compatibility with other EU 
legislation in related areas, its effect on non-participants in the respective IEC 
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initiative and to its durability. Member state officials appeared conscious of the fact 
that there were open questions here, but they did not yet appear fully able to measure 
the kinds of problems· which might present themselves, or decide how to prepare for 
them. 
It may be interesting to see which of these options were named in more than one of 





Table 4 - Options for Enhanced Cooperation in the Internal Market 
IEC could theoretically be used "where the community has not preempted 





One possibility could be environmental tax coordination between Denmark, 
Germany and others 
• **with regard to Art. 133,5 TEC - i.e. with regard to extending the 
application of Art. 133 to services and intellectual property 
Envisageable eventually for: 
• **harmonising certain direct and indirect taxes (in case of generalised 
harmonisation being blocked) but perhaps better via competition than via 
design 
• rules governing capital movements 
• **company/enterprise legislation 
• **environmental legislation (if not product oriented) 
• **eventually, in limited ways (benchmarking, synergetic effects) in em 
ployment policy 
n o t in trade policy (Art. 133 TEC) 
• **services and intellectual property in foreign trade (Art. 133,5 TEC) 
may become an occasion for some form of flexibility 
• **fiscal harmonisation, but as a follow-up to Euro-establishment, 
implemented in a Euro-I I-group, but decided on by the Ecofin Council 
IEC/FEC only very grudgingly accepted: 
• **for environmental protection, temporary flexibility exempting member 
states from fully fulfilling standards 
• **fiscal harmonisation flexibility only in very narrow limits, because of 
the high value of uniformity of the tax system 
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Spain IEC Amsterdam style not accepted in the internal market sector, FEC 
initiatives envisageable in: 
• **fiscal matters in the Euro-zone, capital gains tax, savings of non-
residents, pushed by stability pact; 
• **commercial law (a convention on bankruptcy expected to be the next 
case of enhanced cooperation) in FEC 
• banking law in FEC 
• national competition law application, in FEC 
• deregulation and structural reform policies, in FEC 
Netherlands IEC Amsterdam style should not disrupt the single market, affect the acquis 
or threaten institutional unity. Sole areas for application in: 
• **fiscal matters 
• **environment 
• **external economic relations (Art. 133,5 TEC) 
But room for FEC, in: 
• **education, 
• infrastructure development, 
• research and environmental planning, 
• eventually also in heavy vehicle road transportation . 
Table 5 - IEC Options Named in more than one Hearing 
Fiscal harmonisation 
Environment 
Services and intellectual property, m 
external economic relations 
Company/enterprise legislation 
Employment policy (internal market) 
Education (internal market) 
German officials emphasised the point that if a member state were to participate in an 
IEC initiative it would be permanent, even if it were at a later stage interested in 
exiting. For this member state, the legal quality of this participation equalled that of 
membership of the EU itself. The same was accepted, it seemed, for legislation 
resulting from IEC. 
46 Harnessing Differentiation in the EU - Flexibility after Amsterdam 
It seemed equally accepted that such legislation must not affect the non-participating 
member states. In this sense, IEC aquis was not acquis communautaire, a point which 
a legal specialist o.f the·European Commission asserted. 
(2) New Members Acceding to the Union 
An important question concerns the attitude which new members entering the EU 
adopt vis-a-vis established IEC projects and their legal acquis. The general position 
was made clear by a high ranking official of the Europearz Commission, who referred 
to the precedent of the social protocol on the occasion of the previous enlargement. 
New entrants were then asked to chose, in which camp they would want to place 
themselves. This would be the model for future enlargements as well. 
The predefined IEC in the Schengen acquis field is the acknowledged exception to 
this rule, as the treaty of Amsterdam expressly treats it as a part of that acquis which 
has to be assumed in full by the new members. In fact, officials from the Council 
Secretariat asserted that certain member states had only asked for the transfer of 
Schengen into the Union framework, because they wanted to make sure that the new 
entrants from central Europe would have to take on the Schengen system as part of the 
acqms. 
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_,art two: Interpretation 
The Role of Enabling /EC in the Context of EU Decision-
making Structures 
Having presented the evidence as to how those government and EU officials and 
parliamentarians who were interviewed perceived the new legal flexibility obligations 
and options after Amsterdam, the report now shifts to the domain of 'speculation', of 
the expectations and apprehensions vis-a-vis the new treaty situation which the 
official interlocutors revealed to the team of experts. It will quickly be seen that the 
most sensitive questions concern the future role of enabling JEC, the concept from 
which Amsterdam flexibility derived and which was most closely linked with the 
challenge represented by the Lamers-Schauble paper of 1994. 
The first of these speculative points concerns the motivations which member state 
governments link to their own attitude or attribute to that of other member states 
towards the different kinds of enhanced cooperation in the EU. The second translates 
the interviewed officials' and parliamentarians' reactions into certain 'types' and a 
rough estimate and ranking as to the scope and role of IEC we can expect in the· 
coming years. This is compared to the role of pre-Amsterdam FEC. The third, finally, 
presents some of the consequences, which governments drew for their own future 
b~haviour under the rules of IEC especially in the enabling variant. 
IV. Motivations for Introducing Enabling IEC in the 
Future 
The motivations for initiating and applying future projects of enabling IEC (and 
incidentally of FEC), which the expert team encountered among the officials and 
parliamentarians, have two aspects: 
• Simple acceptability or legitimacy of using certain institutional/procedural 
instruments, of advancing in grouped enhanced cooperation, instead of in the full 
membership mode; 
• the second of the policy lines or major goals which are pursued by the 
introduction and utilisation of this specific new instrument of European 
policymaking, or in reacting to it: 
To ease and improve the introduction or implementation of distinct major 
new policies into or within the institutional framework of the European Union; to 
solve individual issues, face individual major challenges; 
to change the decision-making structure (and the internal balance of power 
?) of the European Union, (be it just in a pragmatic sense to make it more flexible 
and amenable to resolve certain blockages, or more normatively to open the way 
to further deepening of the Union). 
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· 1. Acceptability 
Since Amsterdam enhanced cooperation can be undertaken in a more positive climate 
of acceptance. That was what a German official from the justice ministry, referring to 
the field of civil law cooperation, but jn fact making a more general point, stressed in 
pointing to the new and more positive treaty language vis-a-vis enhanced cooperation 
(IEC), and comparing the very "defensive, tolerating" language of the old Article K. 7 
TEU (FEC), to the new and quasi "encouraging" language on using the new 
instrument for the establishment of closer cooperation to reaGh the objectives of the 
treaty (the general clause (Art. 43, TEU), and in Justice and Home Affairs concerning 
the first and third pillars (Art. 40, TEU and 11, TEC). Governments would therefore 
have fewer legal qualms about exploiting this possibility. Experts did not hear explicit 
statements like this from other governments. But this seems indeed to be a relevant 
sentiment, which underlines the much increased explicit and official legitimation 
which enhanced cooperation of member states in the enabling mode enjoys post 
Amsterdam in certain governments where the goal is to increase the effectiveness of 
integration. 
Certainly, this increased facility for or acceptance of the option of enhanced 
cooperation, having modified the former consensus-searching premium when 
beginning important new policy initiatives, was exactly what other governments 
feared and disliked. 
High ranking Commission officials seemed split on this issue. They did bring 
attention to the important constitutional advance made by an opening of the treaty for 
enhanced cooperation, by getting away from the former one-issue-opening as had 
been the case for the social protocol, and by refraining from putting down a positive 
list of policies open to IEC. They highlighted the positive aspect of groups of member 
states advancing in common instead of putting the negative one of a single problem 
state in the centre. In future, IEC could be initiated without an IGC. It is very clear 
though that strong misgivings about the higher legitimation of enhanced cooperation 
caused by Amsterdam continue to exist in high ranking Commission quarters. 
2. Policy Lines and Major Goals 
Characteristic for almost all the parliamentarians and officials questioned was the 
pervasive uncertainty and hesitancy regarding the major goals to be pursued with the 
introduction of new enhanced cooperation. A "strategic project" was avowed only in 
Germany (see below); but even there the perspective of its successful implementation 
is much reduced in 1998, compared to 1995/6, the year of its conception. Both the 
governments which were questioned and the Commission appeared astonishingly 
uncertain as to the benefits to be attained by implementation of IEC or the risks to be 
eschewed in its utilisation. Policy lines had often not been formulated. Unsurprisingly, 
coming from a candidate state the Polish officials had the smallest contribution to 
make to this debate in the context of specific policy fields. They did however take 
very strong positions on the principal aspects of enhanced cooperation. 
a. Eastern Enlargement 
The different European policy issues evoked in the hearings did not promise to arouse 
the strong motivation necessary for entering into enabling IEC in the status-quo-
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Union of the Fifteen. Many government officials conceded this. For the German 
foreign office, it was the perspective of EU Enlargement above all for which the 
strategic instrument of IECwas intended. It was supposed to guarantee that even the 
enlarged EU would be able to introduce the policies it needed, that the acquis could be 
preserved and that further deepening of integration remained possible for those 
member states intent on going ahead. In a more hesitant vein Dutch diplomats made 
the same point when saying that the true test of the new instruments would come at 
the moment of enlargement. 
But the hearings also showed implicit and explicit contradictions. First and implicitly, 
German officials like others questioned by the experts, were unable to provide a 
single example of the kind of policy which might have to be introduced or 
implemented in applying enabling IEC in an enlarged European Union. Dutch 
officials stressed the need to renounce to projects of additional differentiation at a 
moment when entry negotiations with central Europeans were imminent and at which 
the Union had to make sure that the whole acquis could be fully accepted by the 
candidates and preserved within the entire Union. Their advice was to use the proven 
method of temporary derogations, not IEC. Very explicitly, Danish officials doubted 
that eastern enlargement would generate the need to use the new instruments as 
flexibility was for areas where member states did not share the same objectives. 
Typical of Poland and Hungary et al, as Portugal and Spain in their time, was however 
that they were eager to join everything. They would ask for derogations where they 
were temporarily unable to fully assume certain policies, but they would probably 
give very little cause, either through unwillingness or inability concerning certain EU 
policies, for the existing member states to resort to utilising the instrument of enabling 
IEC. 
In the Polish hearing the contradictions around enlargement were brought home with 
special intensity. Very high-ranking Polish officials did not accept the veiled mistrust 
of their European commitment, which they sensed in flexibility being justified by 
eastern enlargement. They insisted strongly that they wanted to be part of "the acting, 
functioning, decisive organisation ... We do need to join an institution that is able to 
make decisions". The Poles clearly expressed their concern that they might not be 
able to keep up with the rest if the strongest member countries combined to move 
ahead. Therefore from their national perspective there were two good answers to the 
challenge of flexibility. Either squeeze into any IEC initiatives regardless of the cost, 
or if they could not get in, block and hamper such initiatives. 
(1) The European Commission 
The European Commission also, appeared to think less along the first than the second 
of these lines. On the one hand it seemed to find the deterrent function of IEC useful 
against increased obstruction in an enlarged EU.27 Yet on the other hand it was very 
apparent from the officials' declarations that IEC was not to be an instrument to 
facilitate enlargement. The most important, and also contradictory example cited in 
this context was the Schengen acquis. It had been rapidly incorporated into the EU to 
make the Schengen matter part of the acquis to be accepted by new members, thus 
27 Cf. also its remark in the Agenda 2000: ,,The introduction of Enhanced Cooperation will also 
make it easier to take up the challenge of a broader and more heterogeneous Union". 
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preparing the Union's negotiating position for enlargement. In particular, French and 
Dutch negotiators pushe4 in that direction. The price had been its institutional 
organisation as predefined IEC. After this had been achieved, high ranking . officials 
acknowledged that it was now the preservation of the full unity of this acquis among 
its members, and its implementation in the EU which had to be safeguarded against 
the risks of an enabling IEC which might encourage differentiation between old and 
new EU members. 
b. Changing the Institutional Framework of Integration Politics 
As to the change of the institutional framework, the motivations of the policymakers 
questioned will be grouped under three headings: Deepening of European Integration, 
Improvement of its Effectiveness, !EC versus FEC. 
(1) Deepening of European Integration 
Most of the government officials and parliamentarians questioned, including those 
from the candidate state Poland, and the experts present, acknowledged the crucially 
important contribution which grouped initiatives for closer cooperation in new policy 
fields have made to deepen European integration among member states. Generalized 
deepening came about through the attraction generated by grouped progress, either 
over a shorter, or longer term, for instance in EMU and Schengen. But insofar that not 
all member states immediately rally under the banner of such initiatives, they also 
constitute forces of differentiation with potentially divisive effects on the EU. In the 
past four decades, European integration has been able to profit from the deepening 
effect of this differentiation, and avoided its risks. 
For the government officials and parliamentarians questioned this differentiation was 
considered an important and positive dynamic relationship of the EU. Even sceptics 
would agree that it cannot be made to disappear. The principal question about the new 
procedures for incorporating IEC is whether they can harness this potential to reach 
the two goals of deepening integration and avoiding the risk of division, in a better 
way than was possible prior to Amsterdam under FEC. 
This effect was the declared goal of the Franco-German initiative, which persists in 
the text of the general enabling clause Art. 43 TEU. German officials were the only 
ones to present the deepening effect - in the sense described above - loudly and 
clearly as their overarching strategic goal for the new Amsterdam clauses. Deepening 
would thus come about through positive differentiation. 
This attitude is contested by the more inclusive strategies of other governments, which 
would rather pursue the deepening of European integration by reforming the 
institutions and procedures of the European Union. An argument often heard was that 
the promoters of IEC had taken the relatively easier road to avoid having to grapple 
with true institutional deepening, for instance by introducing generalised qualified 
majority voting on EU legislation. In this view, the motivation for attempting the 
necessary deepening of institutions and procedures was being reduced, not improved, 
by opening this side-alley. Two more negative versions of this argument were that 
some member governments had preferred IEC to QMV, because (a) they wanted to 
advance in areas of cooperation specially dear to them without having to wait for the 
rest. thereby creating a privileged group within the EU, and (b) this would increase 
their political clout in future EU negotiations. The Spanish government officials were 
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most vocal in these apprehensions as they thought that IEC would work against 
further deepening ~f integration. As such they took a very reserved general view on 
the new enhanced cooperation rules of Amsterdam (IEC). Polish officials were 
likewise very much opposed and openly referred to the risk that a privileged group 
might be created leaving the other members behind. 28 Both results were according to 
this view contrary to the true goal of deepening European integration. 
(a) The European Commission 
Opening the institutional framework for enhanced cooperation in the interest of 
further deepening of integration did not really appeal to the European Commission 
either. It did not seem to find any strong arguments for this hypothesis, arguing rather 
'e contrario' and defensively. High ranking officials stressed that IEC was not 
intended for those who wanted to advance backwards and reduce integration or 
extract themselves from certain of its policies. It was conceived for those who wanted 
to advance forward. In the hearing however, Commission officials showed they 
shared the scepticism and concern of certain states. 
They preferred, as did the Spaniards, outright institutional deepening of the complete 
decision-making structures, by for instance introducing generalised qualified majority 
voting on EU legislation. They too were concerned that IEC might become a poor 
substitute for the more difficult work of treaty reform. 
(2) Improvement of Effectiveness for European Integration Policy 
Related to the argument of deepening integration and advanced during more than one 
hearing, was that of raising the effectiveness of European integration policy in 
general. On the one hand in increasing the effectiveness of integration in given policy 
areas, at least among a given number of member states, by permitting IEC, and on the 
other hand by increasing vis-a-vis the others the persuasion power of certain member 
states promoting a new policy. They now have the option of IEC, instead of having to 
wait for the last opposing member state to change its mind. Constructive abstention in 
CFSP was considered in the same vein, as a facilitating instrument, to ease the way 
out of deadlock and make a decision possible. Several German officials made this 
point, whilst Danish government officials expected the new clauses to be used as a 
negotiating tool, allowing "compromises which would not otherwise have been 
reached". 
But for many government officials, this had only been a British problem. And this 
was seen to have been resolved with the election of Tony Blair as prime minister. For 
the Dutch officials, among others, it seemed evident that the more pro-European 
position of the new government should not be endangered by implementing EU policy 
instruments intended to discipline or exclude the UK. Inclusive integration politics 
28 This issue has a second more basic aspect, it concerns the relevance of the QMV-issue as such, 
for deepening the EU and therefore as credible alternative to the introduction of flexibility: a 
Danish high official contested this relevance, denying that QMV would ever be the true solution 
to member states' disagreements about policy. In such cases outvoting member states would 
jeopardize the unity of the Union~ patient search for consensus was the only realistic strategy. A 
logical consequence of this reflection would be to accept flexibility as one exit out of the resulting 
dilemma. 
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were the trend, not potentially exclusive ones. But the most vocal opponents against 
this vision were again the .Spanish officials. Their arguments will be presented in full 
because they explicitly· voiced sentiments which other governments probably .share in 
different respects, even if they did not voice them as frankly. For the Spaniards the 
effectiveness-argument pre·sented an open challenge to the accepted balance of power 
and the legitimacy of important considerations in EU negotiations: 
the potential for threats by powerful member country coalitions would 
increase unfairly, even in decision-making by qualified majority; . 
this would reduce the consideration of solidarity which underpinned the QMV 
procedure in the first pillar, making IEC not only a counter-veto, but also a counter-
solidarity instrument; 
certain governments could now be tempted to think that they need not follow 
the normal treaty procedure and compromise any more and that they could introduce 
new policies at the EC level at will as well as control their application. 
Formalising IEC in the treaty risked giving these governments a blank cheque 
and encouragement. A highranking offical even declared that Monnet was being 
replaced by Mettemich. 
IEC would not thus advance integration or its effectiveness, but rather the 
specific agendas of certain member states. Indeed, effectiveness of EU policymaking 
would certainly be endangered by: more opaqueness and complicated procedures, less 
transparency, unnecessary resistance to future initiatives of certain states and 
increased use of the veto-option than was rationally justified. 
Spain would consider blocking IEC initiatives in the first pillar, if first pillar integrity 
were threatened. 
(a) The European Commission 
The effectiveness argument was not fully shared by the European Commission either. 
Certainly it seemed to accept the anti-blockade function of the concept, preferring the 
threat to the application of IEC. But apart from this, its officials did not seem to find 
any additional arguments supporting the hope for improved effectiveness through 
IEC. As in the debate on the deepening hypothesis, Commission officials concentrated 
their efforts on showing that IEC might not after all be as dangerous for the political 
system of the EU as it seemed. 
After seeing that IEC went ahead, in spite of its own original m1sg1vmgs, the 
Commission contributed to hardening the !EC-clauses against the risks of misuse and 
to reduce the fields of application. Application had become difficult as a consequence 
and officials stressed the different conditions, including the obligation of IEC groups 
to remain open to newcomers, · and the ECJ' s power of judicial control. The 
Commission itself held the key to triggering IEC in the first pillar, and was the 
guarantor of successful application. In the first pillar again, it also controlled the later 
access of initial abstainers to established IEC groups. 
The scope of the subject matter for enhanced cooperation was considered a crucially 
important point for effectiveness as well (see below). 
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(3) What Kind of Enhanced Cooperation for Which Member State? 
Behind the debate about the merits of the new procedure of enhanced cooperation, 
vis-a-vis the old one, stood the central question of how to appraise the forces of 
differentiation within the EU, how best to harness them for the benefit of EU-
integration in a general sense, the widening of its competences, the deepening of its 
institutional and procedural structures, and the improvement of its effectiveness. 
For the positions taken by parliamentarians and officials, the first determining 
variable appeared to be self-evaluation by the member states; of their basic attitude 
towards more integration, influenced by their ability to participate and by the 
influence they felt able to exercise through their weight and politics. 
The second position was the quality of the new legal set-up of Amsterdam for 
enhanced cooperation, which already mirrored the contradictory aims behind it. The 
experience of pre-Amsterdam enhanced cooperation clearly influenced the opinions 
about the value of the new rules, about how to interpret them and the role to accord 
them in the future, as compared to FEC. 
In spite of the generally positive evaluation of pre-Amsterdam FEC, there were strong 
differences of opinion concerning the merits of future enhanced cooperation in its pre-
and post-Amsterdam forms. It is important to note that this comparison mainly 
concerns the 'enabling' form of IEC, sometimes also the. 'case-by-case', but not the 
cases of 'pre-defined' IEC, which had already been jointly agreed on by all member 
states at Amsterdam. 
Looking at what may be called the self-evaluation of member states, the hearings 
permitted a rough division between: 
1. A majority group of member governments which in principle welcome the 
further common extension of integrated policies or even consider them unavoidable. 
For want of a better term, they can be designated as 'deepening optimists'. This does 
not mean that all of them support the new Amsterdam rules on enhanced cooperation, 
but only in this first group do these rules find outright supporters. Of the governments 
interviewed, we can count the Dutch, German, Italian and Spanish among them; 
2. a minority position which opposes generalised further integration and 
procedures which reduce their control over its further development. These can be 
designated as 'deepening sceptics'. These first opposed new rules the during the 
negotiations and only reluctantly accepted them at the end. For this second group, the 
consensus-premium of the pre-Amsterdam EU-Treaty was an important insurance that 
they could not be forced against their will into a deepening dynamic inside the Treaty. 
They are conscious of having lost part of this insurance as a consequence of the 
Amsterdam flexibility clauses. Of the governments questioned, the Danish one must 
be classed with this group. Both of these attitudes welcomed or at least accepted the 
reality of differentiation and enhanced cooperation among member states and wanted, 
even accepting the disadvantages and risks, to exploit the dynamic community 
building potential of enhanced cooperation in the future. 
3. The one candidate country government to be questioned, Poland, seemed to 
share fully the 'deepening sceptic' attitude. It differed from both preceding positions 
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in that it did not accept further differentiation and enhanced cooperation, at least for a 
certain time. 
Within what is here called the 'deepening optimist' attitude, three different types of 
attitude towards the new enhanced cooperation clauses were visible. Two of these 
concurred in supporting the new enhanced cooperation rules in the Amsterdam 
Treaty: 
The attitude of those who wanted to open the institutional. framework for their 
own enhanced cooperation initiatives thereby increasing their integration potential for 
all; a stance voiced mainly by the Germans and to a lesser degree also by the Italians; 
and other supporters of this strategy who wanted to prevent future initiators of 
cooperation ventures from realising them outside the community, where other 
members cannot participate at will nor influence them. Here one might place the 
Dutch. 
The first of these attitudes seems typical for the two member states from which the 
proposition originated in the first place, namely Germany and France, big member 
states and makers rather than takers of integration, confident that they would always 
participate in the important groups of enhanced cooperation and have a decisive say in 
their creation. Of the countries questioned, Germany seemed to represent this optimist 
attitude. 
The second attitude, in comparison, seemed a typical reaction of integration minded 
member states, which because of inferior weight and political means, or ability, could 
not hope to initiate such projects themselves and, in the logic outlined above, wanted 
to gain a voice in defining the kind of initiative which they have to follow. Therefore 
they remain interested in the application of the Amsterdam clauses which promise the 
recuperation of FEC into the treaty framework, and the kind of institutionalised 
influence and assured access they look for. 
But, still within the 'optimist' group, there is also a third attitude of those who hold a 
diametrically opposing view and see more of a risk than an opportunity in letting 
enhanced cooperation enter into the treaty framework and be widely applied. The 
Spanish officials seemed to be the most vocal representatives of this line of argument 
which was shared to a certain extent by the Danes, not because they are opposed to 
further integration, but because they fear two negative effects: 
firstly concerning cooperation initiatives that they approve of; that even if they 
want to they will neither be able, nor asked, to participate in enhanced cooperation 
initiatives of other member states inside the institutional framework, because they 
lack the means to do so and cannot force the others to aid them; 
secondly concerning cooperation initiatives that they do not approve of; that 
the safeguards are not strong enough to prevent other member states from going 
ahead, leaving them behind against their will. 
A widely shared concern common here and also among the principal opponents of 
enhanced cooperation, is the fear of destroying traditional power balances in EU 
policymaking, of an unacceptable reduction of their negotiating clout in the EU where 
opposition to initiatives is often a means for states to get their own favoured policies 
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accepted in exchange for agreeing to the wishes of initiators, or of being absent from 
decision (or opi~ion-) making circles, the decisions of which might affect their 
interests. 
When one now tries to rank the governments questioned according to their preference 
for new IEC or for old FEC the result is the following: 
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, all 'deepening-optimists', clearly did not 
welcome the perspective of important new inititiatives o( FEC of the pre-Amsterdam 
kind, because they saw growing disadvantages to this method." They wanted to harness 
the potential of differentiation by applying !EC and not FEC. 
On the other hand, the governments of Spain and Denmark, the first a 'deepening 
optimist', the other a 'sceptic', clearly did not accept this logic. For them, the 
preferred option for harnessing differentiation in a beneficial way for overall EU-
integration was FEC, outside the treaty system proper. IEC constituted an 
unacceptable risk for the unity and governability of the Community system, which the 
others wanted to consolidate by opening it up to closer cooperation. Therefore 
Spanish and Danish officials consented only grudgingly to the majority opinion in 
favour of IEC, and voiced their opposition to any future application of these clauses. 
Spanish officials explicitly foresaw FEC, for instance in Schengen acquis matters in 
the first pillar, finding it "not unthinkable that some progress based on only three or 
four countries could take place in the near future", although "outside the framework 
of the Treaty". 
The Poles, the most hardline of the 'deepening sceptics', did not go along with the 
Danes but adopted an apparently contradictory position. They too, wanted to apply 
IEC, but as restrictively as possible in order "to hamper and block" any enhanced 
cooperation whatsoever, be it IEC or FEC.29 
An important consideration in this context concerned the efficiency and legitimacy of 
integration progress via FEC. For example, Schengen (like EMU's predecessor the 
EMS a form of pre-Amsterdam closer cooperation - FEC), was very successful in 
bringing home affairs of signatory members closer together and increasing the 
effectiveness of their common work. Many officials, for instance from Germany and 
Denmark doubted that flexibility could ever function with comparably good results 
inside the EU as it had done outside as in the case of the Schengen group. There was 
concern about how the communautisation of Schengen would affect its effectiveness. 
But in making a success of Schengen, participants had built up a separate body of 
rules within a field of competence of the EC/EU, namely that of freedom of 
movement for EU-residents and of external border surveillance, thereby reducing the 
EU's ability to create coherent legislation in an original competence field of its own 
and increasing the tension with their obligations under the Article No. 10 (formerly 
29 Only a very isolated minority Polish voice pleaded for accepting more internal differentiation 
inside the EU in the interest of enhancing its flexibility and international competitiveness, for 
accepting that better developed member states can work together to form the vanguard in this 
sense, and to accept a (temporarily ?) inferior position for countries like Poland in the interest of 
the EU's global position. 
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No. 5) TEC. This clearly called into question the legitimacy of the Schengen project. 
This problem was conceded by officials from Germany and to a great extent in the 
European Commission. The IGC's goal was to end parallelism/cleavage in- this 
important field of EU legislation. In addition, and to preempt this kind of risk for the 
future, new FEC was to be discouraged. 
(a) The European Commission 
High ranking European Commission officials clearly belonged to the first group 
which gave priority to IEC, in spite of the high risks they saw "in its application. They 
were reserved vis-a-vis FEC. An important criterion for judgment was EU-
competence; FEC was a good method to work together in areas not falling under EU-
competence, as Schengen and the EMS had been. But in the view of Commission 
officials, there was not much room left for member state cooperation outside the 
competence domain of the EU. For matters falling under EU-competence, FEC was 
on the contrary not acceptable. IEC was the right method as it was fully subject to EU 
disciplines and minimised the disintegrative tendency inherent in free cooperation. 
This position merits further comment. The Schengen agreement had from the 
beginning been organised within the EC's area of competence, namely in the free 
movement of persons in the Common Market. Many member states uninterested in 
quick advances in that field at the time authorised France, Germany and the Benelux 
states to start joint cooperation in that field. So in fact, FEC had already been possible 
in the EC' s area of responsibility in the past. Certain member states, such as Spain, 
also envisaged future FEC exactly within and not outside this domain. If the 
Commission holds to its position, this could create conflict. 
Even so, the high· ranking which FEC received in the prospects for future post-
Amsterdam enhanced cooperation (see above), seems to confirm the enduring 
attraction of this freer and less constrained mode of working together for groups of 
EU member states. 
(b) In Place of a Surnmary 
The following table summarises the basic findings of this subchapter: 
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Table 6 - What Kind of Enhanced Cooperation for Which Member State? 
Revealed Self Evaluation of Basic Position vis-a-vis Enhanced Cooperation of 
Member States as to their: Member States 
Apply Avoid 
--Basic attitude to --Weight Preference to Utilise Enab~ing IEC Preference 
further deepening of m the in Logic of: to Utilise 
integration EU FEC 
Positive <-> Defensive 
diff erentiatio consolidation 
n 
Large D 
Willing and Able NL 
Medium Commission 
Willing and Large I ES 
(not always) Able 
Unwilling, Small DK 
but Able 
Unwilling and not Large Pol Pol 
Able 
V. Probability and Fields of Application of IEC in 
Comparison to Pre-Amsterdam FEC 
1. A Rough Estimate Based on the Hearings 
The testimonies heard during the seven hearings allow the following rough ranking 
(presentation No. 7), concerning the probability of and likely fields, and timescale, of 
the application of new IEC, according to the revealed preferences of the 
parlamentarians and officials interviewed and compared to the continued utilisation of 
pre-Amsterdam FEC. The result is that predefined IEC is the most probable and likely 
category, touching the biggest policy fields, and that enabling IEC in the first pillar 
seems to be the most improbable and least imminent. The case-by-case in the second 
and enabling in the third pillar lie somewhere in between. This is a ranking which 
appeared very probable from the beginning of the hearings, taking into account the 
different degrees of legal obligation, national governments' unavoidable investment 
of effort and risk, controversy surrounding the various options of IEC, and the number 
of member states required for triggering the initiative. The experts were not surprised 
to have their expectations confirmed. 
Evidently. this ranking is not the result of systematic opm1on research, g1vmg 
confirmed ratios or percentages of probability or expected quantities of occurrence. It 
results from listening to the seven hearings and summarises the opinions heard on 
intentions in the different fields as well as the remarks and judgments made in 
reference to already existing or imminent examples of IEC. Readers will see its 
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findings confirmed when they leaf back to the subchapters on the different policy 
fields. 
Nevertheless, this estimate, based to a large extent on opinions and intentions in 1998, 
may be proved wrong by one or two dramatic steps in the coming years, when the 
constellations between member states could generate unexpected coalitions. This too 
was clearly said by our interviewed officials. The estimate cannot yet be based on 
concrete experience of initiatives in enabling and case-by-case IEC, simply because 
these could only be launched after the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force in May 
1999. The little concrete and positive experience there was with IEC at the time of the 
hearings was limited to the aforementioned EMU and Schengen acquis, existing 
initiatives inherited from the past. In this sense, there was some negative experience 
as well. Initiatives in FEC have been started since Amsterdam, for which one could 
have imagined the member states wanting to mould them in the form of future IEC, if 
they had been interested enough or able to do so. The first example to come to mind is 
the Euro-11 Council and the second armaments industry cooperation. In five years' 
time, it will be necessary to see whether reality will have verified, or proved wrong, 
some of the opinions and expectations synthesised here. 
Table 7 - Factors Determining the Probability and Fields of Application of IEC 
degree of degree of number of degree of 
legal memberstate member states controversy 
obligation investment required surrounding 
options 
1) IEC predefined, in very high very low Schengen: nn low 
the Schengen acquis, and EMU: 11 
EMU field; 
2) FEC, mainly applied; 
in CFSP and related low tending more to 1 + n* tending more 
issues; high to low 
in EMU-related medium tending more to 11 + n tending more 
issues; high to low 
in other lst-pillar very low tending more to I+ n tending more 
issues; high to high 
3) case-by-case IEC in very low tending more to 1 tending more 
CFSP; high to high 
4) enabling IEC for 3rd very low very high 7+n very high 
pillar issues; 
5) enabling, IEC for lst very low very high 7+n very high 
pillar issues. 
* '"n" equals one ( l ) or more member states 
The continuing strong role which FEC is to play among EU member states even after 
Amsterdam~ is perhaps the most significant finding of this first rough estimate. The 
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second important, though not really surprising, finding concerns the weak 
perspectives of enqbling IEC. 
VI. Goal Achievement: A short Resume 
1. Deepening of Integration: 
When trying to assess the potential for deepening in the new IEC procedures, one 
often invoked criterion was, if and how they contribute to, and whether they are 
compatible with more orthodox steps of deepening integration, especially with the 
implementation of qualified majority voting where it existed, and with its extension 
into even more EU policy fields. During both the Commission hearing and national 
hearings, a number of officials expressed strong concern regarding this compatibility, 
and in some cases went so far as to impute the initiators of IEC at Amsterdam to have 
established this new procedure instead of an extension of QMV. Even for those who 
did not share this extreme view or contradicted it, like certain Commission officials, 
there appeared to be a high risk that IEC might in the future if not surveilled very 
carefully be chosen instead of QMV, even where this was the official decision-making 
procedure, thus de-communautising and not deepening integration politics. 
A second indicator to be considered was whether the volume of intentions to actually 
utilise enabling IEC could be identified among the parliamentarians and officials, and 
whether these intentions were concentrated in certain member states. Could they lead 
to the formation of a core group of integration deepening in the future? On the basis 
of the hearings a very rough table was produced which groups the parliamentarians' 
and officials' declarations on the different policy fields of the EU. But as already 
pointed out, these declarations only indicated intent in very rare exceptions. Often 
they only indicated hypothetical possibilities perceived by one or the other 
parliamentarian or official. In consequence, no speculation about grouped intentions 
can be made on the basis of.the hearings. The table is reproduced as Table 8. 
A second indicator was found by asking whether functioning IEC projects could be 
shown to be attractive for non-participating members. In 1998, examples of 
functioning IEC could only be found among predefined IEC initiatives already in 
existence; the most prominent case being EMU. Here the Danish hearing proved very 
instructive showing from a government having opted out of the single currency, that 
exclusion from decision-making of the restricted eleven was clearly seen as a serious 
setback to the Danish position in EU fiscal and monetary policymaking. It also 
seemed to show that Danish officials were highly interested in joining those decision-
making and debating circles from which they had excluded themselves. A second 
example is in fact the fate of the Schengen group. Here, for example, the hearing in 
Rome showed the strong interest which former non-participants like Italy develop to 
participate fully in functioning inititiatives of enhanced cooperation. 
Both of these cases seem to indicate the attractiveness of enhanced cooperation for 
other member states. However, a very important caveat must be born in mind. 
Schengen and EMU were started, and developed an irresistible attractiveness, outside 
the institutional framework as projects of FEC! Would they have gained this same 
Harnessing Differentiation in the EU - Flexibility after Amsterdam 61 
attractiveness as IEC projects? Only time will tell but the indicators at our disposal do 
not appear to point in this .direction. 
And certainly the hearings showed that the intention to create successful new IEC 
groups in important issue areas is vehemently opposed by a number of member states 
who count themselves as either unwilling or unable and that the antagonisms 
generated by their creation could counterbalance any attractiveness and even 
outweigh it. The price of partial deepening would be splits in the Union as a whole. 
In a wider sense, deepening of European Integration can only be safely pursued if 
accompanied by an increasing acceptance amongst the population. Greater 
transparency in EU decision-making and policy implementation would be an 
important precondition for this. In a number of hearings the experts and officials came 
to the conclusion that the implementation of IEC would as a consequence produce not 
more but less transparency and less acceptance. 
Finally doubts concerning the need for further important initiatives in IEC in the 
enabling mode and reservations against them, seem to be such that only very few 
initiatives can reasonably be expected in the future. As many officials questioned 
found, Amsterdam style IEC seems to be a far cry from the original positive logic 
behind closer cooperation initiatives since 1995. France and Germany as the initiators 
had wanted to open the treaty itself, including CFSP, to closer cooperation among 
relatively small groups of willing and able member states, which could not be 
prevented by other member states. A liberal enabling mode for all three pillars would 
have. best suited this logic. The goal seemed to be to open a vanguard group option for 
member states which wanted to deepen mutual integration in the future and would be 
able to do so. The logic was positive differentiation. 
An exactly opposite logic of defensive consolidation motivated the integration of the 
Schengen acquis and predefined IEC in the Schengen and freedom of movement 
domain. Compared to positive differentiation, the logic of defensive consolidation is 
more inclusive regarding member states, more attentive to the unity of the institutional 
framework and the legal acquis, more tolerant of deficiencies in ability and conceived 
as temporary, to be corrected in the spirit of EU solidarity. Compared to these 
priorities new advances in integration take second place; new FEC is discouraged. 
This logic became the common denominator in which a disparate coalition against 
positive differentiation came together in the IGC ensuring that the logic of defensive 
consolidation also permeated the new clauses of enabling IEC. This is confirmed by 
the conditions and procedural prescriptions attached to them. That result suited not 
only those member states who wanted to go ahead with further integration, but feared 
for their free access to IEC initiatives in the logic of positive differentiation. It could 
also satisfy those who wanted to reduce to a minimum what they saw as the risks of 
member states breaking out of the logic of consensus in integration politics, or of 
creating different layers of EU-legislation for different groups of members. 
62 Harnessing Differentiation in the EU - Flexibility after Amsterdam 




environment; ecological legislation 
employment at non obligatory level 
fiscal matters, taxes direct and indirect 
services and intellectual, external economic relations 
rules governing capital movements 
corn pany/enterprise legislation 
health 
education 
minimum standards for provisional protection (new art. 63,2,a) 
burdensharing on refugees (new art. 63,2,b), 
harmonisation of subsidiary protection (,,everything 
goes beyond the Geneva~convention") 
grouped advances in the control of illegal immigration b 
means of, a system of finger prints, and of returning illega 
immigrants 




Civil justice neither expressly mentioned by tq~ ~W~,'pott!le,E:GHt~~f:Y~~Ut''''' ' 
practical questions like cross-border-cooperation in groups 
harmonisation in ,,material law" and legal assistance 
common judicial space 
commercial law (bankruptcy most imminent) 
banking law 
Judgements of courts of law in all member countries shoul 
have the same status as in the pronouncing state, in all othe 
MS 
Qualified abstention, for less important onedimensional issues 
issues close to national interests, and more complex not to b 
handled this way. Positive example UN voting or UN and 
other international organizations/multilateral related cases 
Qualified abstention to apply only to the stage of implementin 
resolutions rather than to instrinsic policy formulation. 
J)J<+ 
~;: : i ' 




Qualified abstention to apply only to the stage of implementin 
resolutions rather than to instrinsic policy formulation 
Arms procurement (OCCAR) 
,,Ad hoe" Petersberg-type missions such as operation ,,Alba". 
Transferring judiciary files and evidence, for 
extraditions, for easing hot pursuit 
Find some more common ground for punishable offense 
among member states not too far apart from each other, fo 
instance on membership in criminal or in terrorist organisation 
or associations 
Enhanced cooperation on proceedings with other 
states 
Transfer of operational competences to Europol 
Fight against organised crime, cooperation as wide and as dee 
as possible 
Matters of extradition (suppression among member states) 
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2. Effectiveness: 
The hearings showed that officials were not convinced by enhanced cooperation's 
potential for raising the effectiveness of EU decision-making and policy 
implementation. Would the effectiveness of the EU as a whole be improved by 
advances in certain areas, or by stronger pressure exerted in negotiations against 
obstructive member states? On the latter, the urgency of this problem was seen to be 
much reduced by the change of government in the UK. But even so, officials in many 
capitals clearly expected effectiveness gains for EU integration in general from the 
existence of this new option against obstruction. The Spanish position, on the other 
hand, showed the persisting and well argued reservation against the idea that this change 
in the negotiating power balance would actually ease negotiations. 
As to effectiveness gains for the Union to be gained from advances in certain areas, 
judgments were very mixed indeed, and this related to all policy fields. The pervasive 
concern was that such advances might produce externalities which would harm 
neighbouring areas of the acquis or make further well-ordered advances in the acquis 
impossible, or additionally might have harmful effects on other important aspects of the 
integration process. 
In this context the Commission insisted strongly on the importance of severely 
circumscribing the fields for which IEC could be applied. It should not be allowed for 
one or the other individual directive, for matters of detail, but only for coherent matters 
forming a comprehensive policy field. This was a precondition for giving a positive 
opinion. If IEC was permitted in small-scale fields, cooperation groups of different 
composition and interest risked parceling important policy fields out among themselves 
and ripping them apart. This was similar to the effect of a bomb, the direct opposite of 
both more effectiveness and of deepening. Even if IEC initiatives, which satisfied this 
criterion could be realised against the reservations of other partners; they risked 
provoking fears of domination and resentments which might, as the Spanish officials 
thought, damage the functioning. balance of give and take in traditional EU negotiations 
to the detriment of future effectiveness. It was to neutralise this kind of argument that 
officials of the Commission and of certain governments also insisted that IEC had to be 
open and avoid any hard core structure in order to fulfill a positive role. 
An important caveat must be made as to gains in effectiveness for the procedures within 
prospective groups of enhanced cooperation in the enabling mode. If one takes the 
experience with EMU and the Euro-11 Council as a precedent, and accepts the 
arguments heard from government and EU officials as valid not only for this but also 
for other policy fields, then the new legal situation does not appear favourable for gains 
in effectiveness either. As in the Ecofin Council, the Treaty (Art. 44, TEU and Art. 11, 
TEC) restrains efficient and trustful work among such group members because its IEC 
format does not off er them an official form for meeting and working among themselves. 
According to the Treaty, they prepare their separate policies in full council, and then 
exclude the non-participants for the moment of the vote. As a consequence, other future 
enabled IEC projects will in all likelihood follow the model of EMU and the Euro-11, 
thereby producing separate and informal political councils, which bring together 
participants in the intimacy demanded for trustful and open deliberation of common 
policies, FEC within IEC. It is doubtful that this will aid effectiveness or deepening. 
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Finally, TEU Art. 44( 1) sets another barrier to important gains in effectiveness within 
IEC groups by forcing .them to hold on to the decision-making procedures set by the 
Treaty for the policy field in question. Even if they wanted to replace among themselves 
consensus by qualified majority voting, they could not do so. Officials in one of the 
hearings deplored this as an unnecessary rigidity going against the spirit of enhanced 
cooperation; an important reason was seen in Luxembourg's opposition to this kind of 
flexibility, for example in questions of fiscal policy. 
3. Eastern Enlargement: 
The hearings did not pennit the conclusion that enhanced cooperation in its Amsterdam 
form is to play an important role in solving the difficulties of eastern enlargement of the 
Union. This eventuality was often alluded to as a determining factor for the introduction 
of IEC in the Amsterdam Treaty. But conclusive arguments in that sense were put 
forward by neither government nor Commission officials, except perhaps for the vague 
expectation that new deepening initiatives might be carried through by willing and able 
members, in spite of the recalcitrance or inability of one or the other of the new entrants. 
4. The European Commission: 
The Commission's status as an impartial supranational institution was of crucial 
importance to the functioning and further deepening of European integration. Asked if 
this status would not be impaired by more enhanced cooperation, especially in the form 
of IEC, and whether there was any concern about the impact which use of the 
Amsterdam clauses could have on the effectivness of policy development and 
implementation, Commission officials showed different attitudes, depending on whether 
the Commission's own status, or whether Community procedures in a more general 
sense were involved. In a general sense, the European Commission seemed, at this 
stage, not to have any defined strategy on the new elements of differentiation and on 
whether IEC should be used in the future, as they were mainly concerned about limiting 
the negative effects. As for the complications and difficulties of the new clauses, they 
were the natural result of compromises between fifteen different national positions and 
would have to be applied and then perhaps adapted further. 
The Commission's own status as guardian of the Treaty, as important or even crucial 
actor in integration politics, as the motor of integration, was not seen to be endangered. 
In fact, seeing themselves entrusted vis-a-vis the interested member states with 
extraordinary powers in authorising enabling IEC in the first pillar, and in deciding on 
the accession of non-participating member states to such groups, Commission officials 
considered their status enhanced. They saw status confirmation for other supranational 
institutions, for instance pointing out that the European Parliament's participation in 
enabling IEC decision-making in the first pillar had not been reduced either, in 
comparison to full EU decision-making. Grouped voting in the EP, along the lines of 
the IEC procedure in the Council, had been proposed by certain IGC participants. Out of 
concern for the integrity of the supranational institutions, it was not retained. 
This basically optimistic position can be seen in its evaluation of the triggering 
procedure for IEC and the implementation phase of enhanced cooperation, when the 
Commission might have to take the side of member states which wanted to establish , 
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grouped cooperation in the I st pillar, against the wishes of others who might oppose this 
initiative in the name .of Union integrity. Commission officials saw no reas<?n for 
concern. Had the Commission not already begun to assume an arbitration role between 
member states in other questions as well, such as the conflict between Italy and the 
other member states over landing rights at the new Malpensa airport near Milan? 
Concern is more discernible in rather narrowly procedural points, where IEC affects the 
Commission's institutional role in certain policies. Officials saw an important case in 
the opening of the Commission's initiative monopoly in the Schengen acquis - in the 
first pillar for five years - and by the indeterminate preservation of this opening in the 
second and third pillars. Member state officials appeared to confirm this concern when 
some of them, for instance in Germany, justified a shorter or longer term reduced role of 
the Commission in these fields by the limited capacities and expertise which the 
Commission had there and which prevented it for a certain time from playing its full 
Community part. 
But as for Community procedures in a more general sense and their part in them, certain 
Commission officials showed clearly more concern. For them enhanced cooperation 
especially in its enabling variant, constituted a potentially dangerous innovation, the 
application of which had to be closely watched, and in which the Commission had to 
use its far reaching competences in the first pillar with the greatest circumspection and 
determination. Otherwise, there was a risk that the whole logic of integration politics 
might be turned upside down. One of the most important points was to protect areas 
subject to QMV from an invasion by enabling IEC. 
In arguing in this manner, certain Commission officials shared the concern of many 
national government officials, who were apprehensive about the impact which the use 
of the Amsterdam clauses could have on the unity and effectiveness of European Union 
policy development and implementation. There was a widespread feeling that there was 
already enough differentiation because of Schengen and the other elements introduced 
by Amsterdam. 
VII. Consequences for Future Procedural Reform 
When they compared goals and perspectives of realisation, many parliamentarians and 
officials of the EU and national governments began to reflect on the correct strategy to 
follow for further handling and development of enhanced cooperation in the EU. This 
report will conclude with a summary of the principal options emerging from these 
reflections. 
1. Make the Best of the Amsterdam Clauses and Improve 
them 
The first line of propositions coming from the member state officials takes as its point 
of departure, that the Amsterdam treaty changes were a step in the right direction. What 
they require is application and, for certain governments, improvement in a number of 
areas. This line was taken by the positive governments, Germany and Italy. In the 
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defensive sense the clearly more sceptical Netherlands and Denmark also belonged to 
this group, as did the European Commission. 
Improvements on the new clauses for IEC, were openly demanded by German officials, 
who wanted primarily to ease-the triggering of enabling IEC, and eventually to enlarge 
the scope of this instrument in the sense of the original Franco-German proposal to the 
Amsterdam IGC. The next IGC would be the occasion to reform IEC in this sense. It 
has already been stated that certain top officials in the European Commission concurred. 
It was advisable to test and eventually improve IEC clauses; in the perspective of finally 
getting a simpler and better adapted tool for the use by the member states. 
a. Ease Triggering 
The main impediments to easier triggering of IEC were seen in the new veto-
possibilities introduced against IEC in the first and third pillars and the exaggerated 
importance accorded to the states, in relation to their populations, in determining the 
necessary quorum. 
Accordingly, the veto-option is to be further reduced, 
the conditions for entering IEC in the enabling mode, contained in the three 
flexibility clauses of Amsterdam, have to be loosened, 
The minimum number of member states has to be reduced, and replaced or 
supplemented by a minimum expressed in terms of population. 
b. Enlarge the Scope of IEC and Include the Second Pillar 
In addition, the scope of IEC was to be widened further in security policy by 
reintroducing the demand for the transfer of the WEU into the EU. 
Would this have to be done by means of an IGC? In fact the new Article 17(1) of the 
TEU appears designed to ease that task, once the opposition to this plan, which blocked 
it at Amsterdam, ended. It expressly opens a way to achieve this transfer without having 
to organise an I GC, through a simple consensus decision of the European Council. 
The British reflections on EU defence policy at the Portschach European Council have 
given new vigour to talks among a number of member state governments including the 
French and Germans, on the besJ way to integrate defence policy, and that means the 
WEU, into the EU. 30 If and when this happens, it seems certain to be a major first step 
in the utilisation of the Enabling IEC clauses of Amsterdam. On the other hand it will 
again, as with EMU and Schengen, mean the incorporation into the EU of an already 
existing external project of closer cooperation among member states. Difficult as it will 
be, major planning elements for such a take-over may already be found in the pre-
Amsterdam initiative of transferring the WEU into the EU, making this also, in certain 
ways, predefined IEC ( cf. see above, enhanced cooperation in defence). But the new 
challenge to master may come when the initiators attempt to transfer the mutual 
assistance obligation of Article 5 of the WEU treaty into the second pillar of the EU as 
30 An echo of this was already audible on the occasion of the hearing with the European Commission. 
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well. This will certainly require truly creative handling of the new clauses created by 
Amsterdam. 
2. Reduce the Application and Role of the Amsterdam 
Clauses 
This line was taken, in varying intensity, by Spanish, but _to a certain extent also by 
Danish and Dutch interlocutors. Danish government officials and parliamentarians 
maintained that Denmark would not be active in using the new paragraphs, or would 
even oppose such use by others. It expected these paragraphs to be used as a negotiation 
tool, allowing compromises which would otherwise not have been reached. Dutch 
officials also seemed mainly interested in discouraging enabling IEC from being applied 
over and above its two functions as a negotiating ploy to facilitate decision-making and 
barrier against free coalition building of big member states. Polish officials clearly 
shared these two concerns, but showed themselves willing to be more assertive in their 
resistance against almost any enhanced cooperation in the EU. Finally, the Spanish 
interlocutors wanted to prevent enabling IEC, particularly in the first pillar, but would 
allow FEC. 
3. Facilitate other Methods to Accommodate Diversity in 
the Union 
Another way to reduce the role of the Amsterdam clauses for IEC was explicitly 
recommended in in the Dutch and the Danish hearings. Officials of both governments 
wanted to accommodate diversity between EU member states and societies, or even 
exploit them for the future improvement of EU policies, by proposing a "far more 
flexible, less centralist and institutionalised approach to integration. in the future", in the 
spirit of more Subsidiarity. IEC on the terms of Amsterdam appeared to be a traditional 
approach in this sense, which should not be followed too far. During the Danish 
hearing, certain voices suggested permitting de facto flexibility, by allowing member 
states greater discretion in the application of EU legislation. This could create circles of 
member states sharing a certain spirit in applying EU legislation. Another accent in the 
same vein was audible from Dutch officials who pleaded for less EU legislation and 
more policy competition to enable member states or groups to identify and follow best 
practice. Commission officials accepted the subsidiarity argument as an important 
approach in designing and implementing common European policies and implicitly 
permitting an amount of flexibility. But the important point for them was that this 
approach must not impair the EU's competence for creating effective common 
legislation. In that case, well constructed enhanced cooperation was, in the end, 
preferable to exaggerated subsidiarity. 
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